US v. Turi - Doc. 055 - Initial Motion to Compel Discovery (2014-09-22).pdf (PDFy mirror)

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Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 1 of 69

Jean- Jacques Cabou, No. 022835
Alexander W. Samuels, No. 028926
PERKINS com LLP
2901 N. Central Avenue, Suite 2000
Phoenix, AZ 85012-2788
Telephone: 602.351.8000
Facsimile: 602.648.7000
JCabou@perkinscoie.com
ASamuels@perkinscoie.com

Attorneys for Defendants Marc Turi and Turi
Defense Group

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

V.

1 . Marc Turi; and

2, Turi Defense Group,

Defendants

INTRODUCTION

Defendants and the Government have reached an impasse. The disagreements that
this Court heard at the September 3 CIPA conference regarding what discovery must be
produced in this case have continued and can now only be resolved by this Court. Despite
Defendants' renewed efforts to provide narrowly-drawn categories of documents in their
discovery request, the Government continues to take the unyielding position that it must
produce none of the information requested, because, according to the United States, the
information is "not related to the conduct alleged in the [I]ndictment."' Wrong. As
explained in more-than-required detail in the discovery letter itself, the information
requested is directly related to the allegations made in the Indictment, potentially

' See Ex. A.

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INITIAL MOTION TO COMPEL
DISCOVERY

[FILED UNDER SEAL]

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Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 2 of 69

exculpatory, and thus discoverable not only under Rule 16 but also Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny.

Moreover, the Government's continued insistence that it can deny the requested
information because, in its erroneous opinion, the documents sought are "not related" to
the acts listed in the Indictment is without basis in law. "Evidence that the government
does not intend to use in its case in chief is material [and discoverable] if it could be used
to counter the government's case or to bolster a defense . . . ." United States v. Stevens,
985 F.2d 1175, 1179-80 (2d Cir. 1993) (interpreting Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C), the
predecessor to Rule 16(a)(1)(E), under which Defendants move). So, even if the
Government is correct that the information is not relevant to its case, the requested
documents are nonetheless relevant to the defense case, which, in an effort to avoid this
continued discovery litigation. Defendants have previously set forth in far-more-than-
required detail.

"The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to
a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations." Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). More than just a "fair opportunity," "the Constitution
guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense."
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (emphasis added) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Consistent with that Constitutional right, Rule 16 provides that
discoverable information includes items "material to preparing the defense," not just
items material to the Government's side of the story. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(l)(E)(i).
Because the discovery requested here goes to the absolute heart of the defense, both Rule
16 and the Constitution require its production.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Prior to the September 3 CIPA conference, Defendants requested from the
Government on August 6 various categories of discovery, which Defendants believed to
be classified or classifiable (the "August 6 Letter").^ This request was in addition to a

^ See Ex. B.

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Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 3 of 69

request for non-classified discovery, sent July 3 1 ? The Government denied the August 6
request, insisting that it would produce none of the information sought. At the
September 3 CIPA conference, this Court noted that at least some of the categories of
information requested by Defendants may be discoverable pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.
16. Accordingly, the Court established a schedule for the parties to exchange further
communications on the subject and, if necessary, brief a motion to compel.

Pursuant to that scheduling order. Defendants sent the Government a supplemental
request for discovery on September 8 (the "Discovery Request").'* Frustratingly, the
Government's response, received September 15, still refused to produce any of the
requested information.^

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At its core, the Indictment alleges that Defendants, a State Department licensed
arms dealer and its President who have previously, unquestionably, worked for the U.S.
government through the Central Intelligence Agency, lied in an effort to arrange for the
eventual transport of $267 million worth of weapons into Libya in 201 1.^ It alleges that
they intended to transport this extraordinary quantity of weapons with the assistance of
foreign governments. It alleges that they intended to transport the weapons on dozens of
planes into NATO-restricted airspace without NATO approval or detection.' It alleges
that they did so unilaterally. In other words, it alleges that they did so without any
knowledge or involvement of the United States Government. Nonsense.

The Government's story defies common sense and ignores basic realities and the
facts. Defendants will show all of this, and more, at trial. In particular. Defendants intend
to vigorously pursue a public authority defense, already noticed in this case, and premised
on certain facts including, but not limited to, that: (1) Defendants had previously worked

' See Ex. C.
^ See Ex. D.
I See Ex. A.

See, e.g.. Indictment at 9.
' See, e.g.. Indictment at 10.

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Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 4 of 69

with the U.S. Government, including the CIA, on covert weapons transactions,^ (2) those
transactions bore substantial similarities to the ones here, (3) Defendants either actually
had public authority for the actions at issue here or reasonably believed that they had such
authority based on that prior relationship, (4) the United States did in fact covertly arm the
Libyan rebels using a plan remarkably similar to the one at issue here, (5) the United
States frequently assists in the covert transportation of arms, and (6) the manner and
means by which the United States typically conducts such transactions are identical to
what actually happened in this case.

As to some of those premises, the Defense is already certain both that they are
true and that the Government possesses documents corroborating these assertions. As to
others, the Defense, through its investigation to date, has a good-faith belief to believe that
they are true and that the Government possesses corroborating evidence of the assertions.
As to all of them, the Defense has made reasonable and sufficiently narrow requests for
material evidence from the Government, which the Government has declined to provide.

THE REQUESTS

In the updated discovery request. Defendants sought eight categories of documents
relevant to the defense, within the possession of the Government, and discoverable under
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16. Those requests are copied verbatim here:'

1) Any documents within the possession, custody or control of the Central
Intelligence Agency containing the names Marc Turi or Turi Defense Group. This
request includes specifically, but is not limited to:

a. Documents held, received, or created by the Near East Division (the "NE
Division") of the Directorate of Operations (the Clandestine Service) of the
CIA in the NE Division's "Memorandum Database."

b. Documents held, received, or created by the Office of Covert Procurement.

* The Government does not appear to dispute this fact. Additional evidence
the Government possesses corroborating the Defendants' relationship with the CIA and
the specifics of how previous transactions were conducted are nonetheless discoverable.

^ See Ex. D.

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Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 5 of 69

c. Accounting, banking, or other financial records reflecting or related in any
way to the payment of funds to Marc Turi or Turi Defense Group.

2) Any documents or other evidence relating to instances in which the United States
assisted or considered assisting in the covert transportation, provision, acquisition,
transfer, or transport of Defense Articles" to or from any person, entity, group of
people, quasi-governmental entity, or government within the territory of Libya
within the timeframe of 2010 to the date of this request.

a. This includes, but it is certainly not limited to, prior approval requests,
approvals, denials. Returns Without Action ("RWAs"), licenses, and other
approvals granted for any such transaction. It also includes the Covert
Action Findings authorizing the program pursuant to which such covert
actions were undertaken.

b. The basis for this request is a much-more-than-good-faith belief that the
United States did covertly assist in the procurement and/or transportation of
arms for individuals and/or entities in Libya pursuant to a Covert Action
Finding issued by the President.'^ Defendants have noticed their intent to
use a public authority defense. One prong of that defense will be that,
during the relevant time frame. Defendants were acting at U.S. Government
direction and consistent with U.S. Government interests. The Covert Action
Finding(s) in effect at this time, and whether the United States covertly
supported the arming of individuals and/or entities in Libya have a tendency
to make the facts underlying Defendants' proffered defense "more probable
or less probable than [they] would be without the evidence." [United States
v.] Stever, 603 F.3d [747, 753 (9th Cir. 2010)] (citing Fed. R. Evid. 401).
So does the manner in which that transaction or series of transactions
occurred.

Because Mr. Turi received such funds and because such records are required
to be maintained by law, including for the purposes of congressional oversight, we are
certain that such records exist.

As used in this letter and any subsequent letters, "Defense Articles" means
items included in the United States Munitions List. See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1.

See, e.g.. United Nations Security Council Final Report of the Panel of
Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) Concerning Libya (Feb. 15,
2014), available at http://www.securitvcouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-
4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s 2014 106.pdf (last accessed July 24, 2014) ("U.N.
Final Report"); James Risen, Mark Mazzetti, and Michael S. Schmidt, US.-Approved
Arms for Libya Rebels Fell Into Jihadis' Hands, New York Times (Dec. 5, 2012),
available at http://www.nvtimes.com/2012/12/06/world/africa/weapons-sent-to-libvan-
rebels-with-us-approval-feli-mto-islamist-hands.html?pagewanted=all& r=0 (last
accessed Aug. 5, 2014) ("N.Y. Times Article"). Senator McCain has publicly stated that
the United States helped arm the Libyan rebels. See Ali Gharib, McCain Falsely Claims
US. Armed Libya Rebels to Make the Case for Arming Syrians, Think Progress (June 15,
2012), available at http://thinkprogress.org/securitv/20 1 2/06/ 1 5/50043 3/mccain-arms-
rebels-libva-svria/ (last accessed Aug. 5, 2014) ("Think Progress Article").

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Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 6 of 69

3) Any documents or other evidence relating to instances in which the United States
assisted or considered assisting in the covert transportation, provision, acquisition,
transfer, or transport of Defense Articles to or from any person, entity, group of
people, quasi-governmental entity, or government within the territory of Qatar
and/or the United Arab Emirates within the timeframe of 2010 to the date of this
request.

a. This includes, but it is certainly not limited to, prior approval requests,
approvals, denials, RWAs, licenses, and other approvals granted for any
such transaction. It also includes the Covert Action Findings authorizing the
program pursuant to which such covert actions were undertaken.

b. The basis for this request is largely the same as the basis for Request 2.
Publically available materials suggest that Libyan and/or Syrian rebels were
armed, pursuant to a Covert Action Finding signed by the President, with
the cooperation of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. If the United States
assisted in that effort, and used the same two countries at issue in this case,
that has a tendency to make the facts underlying Defendants' proffered
defense "more probable or less probable than [they] would be without the
evidence." Stever, 603 F.3d at 753 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 401). And again,
the manner in which any such transaction was conducted, not just the
transaction's existence or non-existence, is material to the defense.

4) Any documents or other evidence relating to instances in which the United States
assisted or considered assisting in the covert transportation, provision, acquisition,
transfer, or transport of Defense Articles to or from any person, entity, group of
people, quasi-governmental entity, or government within the territory of Syria
within the timeframe of 20 10 to the date of this request.

a. This includes, but it is certainly not limited to, prior approval requests,
approvals, denials, RWAs, licenses, and other approvals granted for any
such transaction. It also includes the Covert Action Findings authorizing the
program pursuant to which such covert actions were undertaken.

b. The basis for this request is a much-more-than-good-faith belief that the
United States covertly assisted in the procurement and/or transportation of
arms for individuals and/or entities in Syria. Publically available

See, e.g., Greg Miller & Jobv Warrick, CIA Preparing to Deliver Rebels
Arms Through Turkey and Jordan, Washington Post (June 14, 2013), available at
httpV/www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-securitv/cia-preparing-to-deliver-rebels-
arms-through-turkev-and- iordan/20 1 3/06/ 1 4/e3 8dab£2-d522- 1 1 e2-a7 3 e-
826d299ff459 story.html (last accessed Aug. 5, 2014) ("2013 Washington Post Article");
Mark Hosenball, Exclusive: Obama Authorizes Secret U.S. Supj)ort for Syrian Rebels,
Reuters (Aug. 1, 2012), available at http://www.reuters.coni/article/20 1 2/08/0 1/us-usa-
svria-obama-order-idUSBRE870 1 OK20 1 2080 1 (last accessed Aug. 5, 2014) ("Reuters
Article"); Karen De Young & Liz Sly, Syrian Rebels Get Influx of Arms with Gulf

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Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 7 of 69

documents suggest this transaction was executed in much the same way as
the Libya transaction, by using partner countries within the region as
middle-men, with the U.S. providing only logistical support. The manner in
which the U.S. typically conducts covert arms transactions is highly material
to the defense. Here, we have a good-faith belief that evidence exists of one
such transaction that bears high levels of similarity to the one alleged in this
case.

5) Any documents or other evidence relating to involvement or contemplated
involvement by the United States in any transaction, or series of transactions,
discussed in the United Nations Security Council (or its experts, investigators, or
staff) relating to that body's Final Report of the Panel of Experts Established
Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (20 J 1) Concerning Libya}^ This includes, but it is
certainly not limited to, prior approval requests, approvals, denials, RWAs,
licenses, and other approvals granted for any such transaction.

a. This request may well be duplicative, as this transaction may be covered by
Requests 2 and 3. To the extent it is not, however, it is material to the
defense for the same reasons identified in those requests.

6) Any documents or evidence relating to the United States' participation or refusal to
participate in that United Nations Security Council investigation.

a. Again, it is material to the defense to know whether the U.S. covertly
supported the shipment of arms into Libya, particularly if through Qatar and
the United Arab Emirates. Evidence of any participation or refusal to
participate in this UN investigation would help aid in the preparation of the
defense and, ultimately, would help the jury in this case determine what, if
any, involvement the U.S. had.

7) Any end user certificates used in transactions from 2008 to present that received
covert U.S. Government support where, because of a covert action, the end user
listed on the end user certificate is not the end user intended by the U.S.
Government or CIA.

a. Defendants have a much-more-than-good faith belief, both through publicly
available documents and through highly credible investigative interviews,
that the U.S. often covertly supports arms transactions in which arms are
transshipped through an intermediary and/or where, because of a covert
action, the end user listed on the end user certificate is not the end user

Neighbors' Money, U.S. Coordination, Washington Post (May 15, 2012), available at
http://wvvw.washingtonpost.com/world/national-securitv/svrian-rebels-get-influx-of-arms-
with-gulf-neighbors-monev-us-coordination/20 1 2/05/ 1 5/gIQAds2TSU storv.html (last
accessed AugT 5, 2014) ("2012 Washington Post Article").
See U.N. Final Report (note 1 2, supra).

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Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 8 of 69

intended by the U.S. Government or CIA.'^ Documents relating to those
transactions, particularly during the time frame Defendants have been in this
business, bear directly on Defendants' proposed defense. The defense is
unable to further narrow this request to identify specific transactions (other
than those identified in Requests 2-5) as it cannot know of specific deals
done pursuant to such an arrangement given their covert nature.

8) Any communications or other evidence relating to the Spring 2011 email
communications between Defendants and Christopher Stevens.

a. Emails to Defendants suggest that Ambassador Stevens intended to take
some further action with the State Department regarding Defendants' role in
attempting to arm the Libyan rebels. Other evidence confirms that
Ambassador Stevens was made aware of Defendants' proposed
transaction.'^ Any subsequent communications within the Government
about this transaction (including, but not limited to. Defendants'
involvement in it), or other evidence generated as a result thereof, is directly
relevant to whether the Government was working with Defendants on any
such transaction.

In a previous letter of July 31, 2014, Defendants also sought production of a ninth

category of documents, which the Government has not produced and which Defendants

now ask this Court to compel the Government to produce:

9) Any documents relating to the requests for prior approval relevant to this case,
including, but not limited to:

a. All communications at the State Department - Directorate of Defense Trade
Controls (DDTC) - associated with Case Numbers BA-L079-11, BA-L085-
1 1, BA-Ll 10-1 1, and BA-L189-1 1 from March to September 201 1.

b. All communications at the State Department - Bureau of Political Military
Affairs Regional Security and Arms Transfers (PM/RSAT) - associated with

See, e.g., Ex. E (Ken Silverstein, Licensed to Kill, Harper's Magazine
(May 1, 2000) (detailing how arms dealer Ernst Werner Glatt worked with the U.S.
covertly for decades and frequently was required to use end user certificates stating false
end users in such transactions)). Defendants are further prepared, as described previously
in this letter, to proffer expert testimony along these lines if necessary.

See Ex. F (U.S. v. Turi 005769) (6/14/1 1 email from A. Yfantis to Y. Adam
and M. Turi stating that "MR STEVENS THE AMERICAN EMBASSEDOR IN

BENGHAZI HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THE ARRANGEMENT AND THINGS

SHOULD BE OK").

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Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 9 of 69

Case Numbers BA-L079-11, BA-L085-11, BA-Ll 10-11, and BA-L189-11
from Macch to September 20 1 1 .

c. All communications at the State Department - Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs (NBA) - associated with Case Numbers BA-L079-11, BA-L085-11,
B A-L 1 1 0- 1 1 , and B A-L 1 89- 11 from March to September 20 1 1 .

d. All communications at the State Department - Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor Affairs (DRL) - associated with Case Numbers
B A-L079- 1 1 , B A-L085- 1 1 , B A-L 1 1 0- 1 1 , and B A-L 189-11 from March to
September 2011.

e. All communications at the Department of Defense (DoD), including but not
limited to communications with the applicable DoD desk officer, associated
with Case Numbers BA-L079-11, BA-L085-11, BA-Ll 10-11, and BA-
LI 89- 1 1 from March to September 2011.

f. All communications associated with State Department DDTC Licensing
System (EUie) associated with Case Numbers BA-L079-11, BA-L085-11,
B A-L 1 1 0- 1 1 , and B A-L 1 89- 1 1 from March to September 20 1 1 .

g. All communications associated with PM/RSAT former Assistant Secretary
of State Andrew Shapiro associated with Case Numbers BA-L079-1 1, BA-
L085-1 1, BA-Ll 10-11, and BA-Ll 89-1 1 from March to September 201 1.

h. All communications associated with Director of Defense Trade Controls
licensing Kevin Maloney associated with Case Numbers BA-L079-1 1, BA-
L085- 1 1 , BA-L 1 10- 1 1 , and BA-L 1 89- 1 1 from March to September 20 1 1 .

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 16(a)(l)(E)(i) requires the disclosure of any item "material to preparing the
defense." Documents are "material to preparing the defense," id, when the documents
are "relevant to the development of a possible defense." United States v. Clegg, 740 F.2d
16, 18 (9th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added); see also Fed. R. Evid. 401(a) ("Evidence is
relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."). The Government must accordingly produce documents when the
defendant "present[s] facts which would tend to show that the Government is in
possession of information helpful to the defense." United States v. Mandel, 914 F.2d
1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Little, 753 F.2d

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Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 10 of 69

1420, 1445 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453, 1466-68 (9th Cir.
1984)).

A defendant must of course "make a threshold showing of materiality." United
States V. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 1995). But that threshold showing simply
requires "a presentation of facts which would tend to show that the Government is in
possession of information helpful to the defense." Id. (Emphasis added) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).

Owing in large part to the Constitution's guarantee that defendants may mount a
complete defense, "[m]ateriaiity is a low threshold; it is satisfied so long as the
information" would help the Defendants prepare their defense. United States v.
Hernandez-Meza, 720 F.3d 760, 768 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Although Defendants must identify how the information is relevant to their
defense, "[a] defendant needn't spell out his theory of the case in order to obtain
discovery. Nor is the government entitled to know in advance specifically what the
defense is going to be." Id. Rather, Defendants need only make a sufficient showing of
materiality, a low threshold that the Ninth Circuit has linked to Fed. R. Evid. 40rs
relevance standard. See United States v. Stever, 603 F.3d 747, 753 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding in context of evidence relating to potential defense that evidence should have
been produced pursuant to Rule 16(a)(l)(E)(i) if it had "'«ny tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable that it would be without the evidence'" (quoting Fed. R. Evid.
401)).

Especially where, as here. Defendants seek to rely on an afiirmative defense,

the Ninth Circuit has recently and repeatedly compelled production of specific categories
of documents supporting the affirmative defense. See, e.g.. United States v. Muniz-
Jaquez, 718 F.3d 1180, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting Government claims of a
"fishing expedition" and ordering discovery of dispatch tapes and other evidence
supporting affirmative defense of official restraint in illegal re-entry case); United States

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V. Doe, 705 F.3d 1 134 (9th Cir. 2013) (vacating conviction and holding that district court
abused its discretion by failing, under Rule 16(a)(l)(E)(i) materiality standard, to require
production of documents relevfint to affirmative defense of public authority).

ARGUMENT

A. Evidence relating to Defendants' activities with the CIA and any other
Government entity for purposes of providing support for covert arms
transactions is discoverable under Rule 16.

In Request 1, Defendants seek evidence that they know exists. They are asking for
information confirming their own prior involvement with the U.S. Government on covert
weapons transactions. What could be more narrow than a discovery request about
themselves? But still the Government refuses to produce.

Undoubtedly, Defendants have an obligation to "make a threshold showing of
materiality." Santiago, 46 F.3d 885 at 894. The documents sought in Request 1 are not
just material to the defense - they are crucial to it. For this set of requests. United States
V. Juan is directly on point. 776 F.2d 256, 258 (11th Cir. 1985). There, the Eleventh
Circuit held that the defendant, just like Defendants here, was entitled to disclosure, in
another CIPA case, of evidence of past similar acts he had performed in cooperation with
the U.S. Government. Id Even while questioning the persuasiveness of such evidence,
the Juan court held that "the past events tend to make more plausible that which, absent
proof of those events, would be implausible," and thus that disclosure was required. Id.
Like Juan, this is a "peculiar" case, and one in which Defendants' claim of believed
public authority (either actual or mistaken) is supported by evidence of past acts done in
cooperation with covert agents of the U.S. Government. Id.

Similarly authoritative is Doe, 705 F.3d 1134, in which the defendant sought
evidence under Rule 16 to support his public authority defense. Doe sought two
categories of documents: (1) documents evidencing information Doe had previously
provided to the Government through cooperation and (2) a broad group of documents
evidencing the relationship Doe had with the Government. Id. at 1 1 50. The district court
denied the requests as overbroad; but the Ninth Circuit reversed. Id. In doing so, the

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Ninth Circuit noted that the requests explained "the specific information Doe was
requesting and the types of documents that would likely contain the information he
sought." It also noted that the nature of the documents was such that Doe could be no
more specific. Id. ("Unless Doe had knowledge of specific FBI documents he could point
to by name and date of creation, a scenario we highly doubt existed, Doe's requests could
not have been any more pointed.").

The same is true of Defendants' Request 1 (and other requests) here. And just like
in Doe, the documents requested here could be used by Defendants "to help establish
[their] state of mind," establish their credibility, and by the jury to determine "whether
[Defendants'] belief that [they were] working with the [Government] was reasonable." Id.
As noted above and in documents previously filed with this Court, Defendants will pursue
a public authority defense in this case. Especially to a jury likely familiar only with the
subject matter of this case from spy novels and movies, that defense is unquestionably
more solid with documents in the Government's possession confirming that Defendants
have previously worked with the CIA on international weapons deals. To make this point,
Defendants should not be required to rely solely on their testimony and/or that of their
witnesses. Defendants are certain that the Government is in possession of documents
confirming their involvement with the CIA on previous covert transactions ~ transactions
which were ongoing at the time of the events in question. They are, by rule and by the
Constitution, entitled to those documents.

But beyond simply adding great heft to a defense which might otherwise seem
incredible, those documents will corroborate that the details of the proposed transactions
at issue in this case bore material similarities to Defendants' prior transactions done with
U.S. Government involvement and support. Those documents, we believe, will also
corroborate the likely testimony of experts in the field of international covert arms
procurement.

Far exceeding the low standard required for discovery of these documents.
Defendants have not only repeatedly explained how the requested documents are material

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to their defense, but have also directed the Government to particular parts of the CIA and
to particular databases within the CIA that they know hold relevant documents. This level
of particularity is above and beyond what Rule 16 requires. Although, given the nature of
the CIA's business, it is impossible for Defendants to provide an exhaustive list of the
types of relevant documents that might exist, they have provided in Request 1 very
specific direction regarding certain areas in which they know relevant documents exist.

B. Evidence relating to what actions the U.S. Government actually took (or
didn't take) in getting weapons into Libya is discoverable under Rule
16.

In Requests 2, 3, 5, and 6, Defendants seek discovery relating to the arming of the
Libyan rebels. Central to Defendants' public authority defense is the premise that the
U.S. Government sought to covertly assist in the arming of the Libyan rebels.
Conclusively demonstrating that premise is true is critically material to the defense, and
this case. Strong reasons exist to believe this premise is true, but Defendants are entitled
to prove its truth with documents possessed by the Government, which Defendants
strongly believe exist.

The Government maintains that the requested documents are beyond the scope of
appropriate discovery here because they do not relate to the transaction charged in the
Indictment.'^ But that is not the test. Stever is particularly instructive. 603 F.3d 747.
There, the defendant was charged with various crimes relating to growing marijuana. Id
at 750. He "sought to defend on the ground that the marijuana growing operation found
on an isolated comer of his mother's 400-acre property was the work of one of the
Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) that had recently infiltrated Oregon." Id.

Stever filed a Motion to Compel Discovery, seeking "any reports in the
government's possession describing the 'characteristics, modus operandi, and other
information regarding' Mexican DTOs involved in growing marijuana." Id. at 751. In
support of his request, he "drew upon news reports, publically available information," and
other documents "to argue that Mexican DTOs had recently infiltrated Eastern Oregon"
See Ex. A.

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and "that the operation on Stever's property bore several distinctive characteristics of
Mexican DTO operations." Id. Stever also proffered an expert who could testify
regarding the modus operandi of DTO operations. Id. at 752.

The district court denied the Motion to Compel. The Ninth Circuit, however,
reversed Stever's convictions, holding that the district court erred in denying the motion
even under a deferential abuse of discretion standard of review. Id. at 753. In doing so,
the court emphasized the low threshold standards of materiality and relevance.

As in Stever, Defendants here have identified a specific defense and have
enumerated specific types of evidence material to that defense. Also like Stever,
Defendants provided, first in the August 6 Letter and now in the Discovery Request,
publicly available documents indicating the existence of such evidence. Moreover, as in
Stever, Defendants here could, as part of a "presentation of 'facts which would tend to
show that the Government is in possession of information helpful to the defense,'"
Santiago, 46 F.3d at 894 (citation omitted), present or proffer the testimony of highly
credible expert witnesses.

As detailed in Defendants' Discovery Request, (1) UN documents show that arms
entered Libya through Qatar and the UAE, the countries at issue here;'^ (2) major news
organizations have reported that the U.S. assisted in arming the Libyan rebels;''
(3) Senator McCain has publicly stated that the U.S. assisted in arming the Libyan
rebels;^^ and (4) Defendants have a good-faith basis to believe the President issued a
Covert Action Finding for Libya during the relevant time. Defendants thus have a much-
more-than-good- faith belief that the U.S. did covertly assist in arming the Libyan rebels.^'
They are entitled to discovery related to that transaction (or those transactions).

U.N. Final Report (note 12, supra).
N.Y. Times Article (note 12, supra).
Think Progress Article (note 12, supra).

Defendants' investigation to date confirms that, should this Court desire,
and should the proper procedures be instituted. Defendants could present multiple
exceptionally crecfible witnesses on this issue.

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The discovery requested will help prove that the U.S. desired to arm the Libyan
rebels, thus making Defendants' claim of public authority significantly more plausible. It
will likewise show how that transaction (or those transactions) was conducted, likely
confirming that the consummated transaction (or those transactions) bore material
similarity to the proposed transaction at issue here.

Moreover, even in the highly unlikely scenario where such documents showed that
the U.S. had no involvement whatsoever in transporting arms to Libya, those documents
would still be discoverable under Rule 16. Such documents would undoubtedly undercut
Defendants' proposed public authority defense. And even where documents weaken
rather than strengthen a potential defense. Rule 16 requires their production in response to
a defense request. See Doe, 705 F.3d at 1151 ("Even if the documents [requested under
Rule 16] caused [defendant] to completely abandon [his] entrapment defense and take an
entirely different path, the documents would still have been 'material to preparing the
defense' under Rule 16(a)(l)(E)(i)."). "A defendant who knows that the government has
evidence that renders his planned defense useless can alter his trial strategy. Or he can
seek a plea agreement instead of going to trial." Muniz-Jaquez, 718 F.3d at 1183.
Further, even "[i]nformation that is not exculpatory or impeaching may still be relevant to
developing a possible defense." Id. (emphasis added).

As part of the ongoing defense investigation of this case, defense counsel has
personally interviewed multiple individuals with irrefiitably credible experience in the
business of covert arms dealing for the U.S. Government. Among other material topics,
these witnesses could testify that Defendants' actions here are consistent with a U.S.-
backed, CIA-involved, covert transaction. But Defendants should not be required to
prove up their defense through testimony alone.

Rule 16 requires the Government to produce corroborating (or impeaching)
discovery on these points. Simply put, whether the United States supported an arms
transaction in Libya during the relevant time period, and how it supports covert arms
transactions in general, are highly relevant to Defendants' public authority defense. It

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defies common sense to think that the Government possesses neither documents showing
it was involved in covert weapons transport to Libya nor documents showing it was not so
involved. Surely one of those sets of documents must exist. Defendants are entitled to
have them.

C. Evidence relating to how the U.S. Government covertly transfers
weapons is discoverable under Rule 16.

In Requests 4 and 7, Defendants seek evidence relating to how the United States
conducts covert weapons transactions generally. Just as evidence of how the U.S. assisted
in the covert transportation of weapons into Libya is discoverable here, so is evidence of
how the U.S. conducts such covert transactions generally. And just as recent Ninth
Circuit case law directly supports Defendants' request for documents relating to a
transaction with Libya, it likewise supports Requests 4 and 7. Just as the modus operandi
of Mexico DTOs was critical evidence in Stever, so is the modus operandi of the U.S.
Government in covert arms dealing here. See 603 F.3d at 752. Moreover, the evidence
requested would "tend to make more plausible that which, absent proof of those events,
would be implausible." Juan, 116 F.2d at 258.

Given the potentially broad subject matter at issue here. Defendants have asked
only for very specific evidence, which they have a good-faith basis to believe exists, to
help them prove how the United States typically conducts these types of transactions. In
an attempt to be as specific as possible. Request 4 directs the Government's attention
specifically to Syria, where public documents again provide Defendants a good-faith
belief that the U.S. has assisted in the covert procurement of arms for rebel forces. Also
narrowly. Request 7 seeks only (1) end-user certificates (2) for transactions in which the
U.S. provided covert support (3) and for which the listed end-user was not the end-user
intended by the U.S. Government. One would think that's a very small pool of
documents, although our research has begun to make us think it might be quite large.

See 2013 Washington Post Article; Reuters Article; 2012 Washington Post
Article (note 13, .sMpra).

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Again, Defendants have a good-faith basis for their request. A 2000 Harper's
Magazine article, for example, details how arms dealer Ernst Werner Glatt spent decades
assisting the United States in covert weapons transactions and often doing so through the
use of end-user certificates listing false end-users.^^ And again. Defendants could provide
expert testimony that the U.S. Government still commonly uses private-sector arms
brokers, friendly intermediary countries, and misleading end-user certificates to covertly
assist in the transportation of arms around the world today.

D. Evidence relating to actions taken within the Government at

Defendants' request for the transaction at issue here is discoverable
under Rule 16.

Finally, Requests 8 and 9 relate to direct evidence of Government actions taken
relating to the transactions at issue here. Evidence relating to the acts underlying the
alleged offenses is, by definition and by common sense, central to this case. Muniz-
Jaquez, decided just last year, is analogous and on point. 718 F.3d 1 180. There, Muniz-
Jaquez was charged with violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), which prohibits a deported alien
from entering, attempting to enter, or being found in the United States. Id. at 1182.
Critically, Muniz-Jaquez was charged only with being found in the United States, and thus
sought to pursue an official-restraint defense on the theory that he was watched by
Government agents from the time of his entry to the time of his arrest. Id. After learning
that the arresting Agent called for backup immediately after sighting Muniz-Jaquez and
that the call was tape-recorded, Muniz-Jaquez moved for disclosure of the tape under Rule
16. Id. The district court denied the motion, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
the tapes were directly relevant to the defense because they might reveal Muniz-Jaquez's
location at the time he was sighted and provide impeachment of the Agent's version of
events.

Here, Request 8 seeks any internal State Department communications in 2011
regarding Defendants' potential involvement (or non-involvement) in any covert weapons

2^ See Ex. E.

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Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 18 of 69

transactions involving Libya. Request 9 seeks documents and communications within
specific units of the Government regarding the prior approval requests at the center of this
case. Both categories of information are undoubtedly material, as they would by their
very nature relate directly to the potential transactions at issue here. Moreover, there is
strong reason to believe such communications and documents exist. At least some of the
documents requested in Request 9 must exist, as they are created by standard procedure
during the prior approval process that was completed here. The communications and
documents requested in Request 8 also likely exist, as Defendants exchanged emails with
Christopher Stevens, then-Special Envoy to the Libyan TNC.'^'' Ambassador Stevens's
response overtly mentions further actions taken by Ambassador Stevens in direct response
to Mr. Turi's email. And further discovery in this case indicates further communication
with Ambassador Stevens and his team.^^ This provides not only reason to believe that
further discoverable documents exist, but also a direct and easily discernible starting point
for where the Government should start looking for that information. As in Muniz-Jaquez,
the evidence requested here would reveal facts critical to a clearly identified defense and
provide potential impeachment of the Government's story. Moreover, some of the
documents must exist and as to others, as in Muniz-Jaquez, the statements of a
Government agent indicate that the evidence sought exists. "This [is] not a fishing
expedition." Id. at 1184.

CONCLUSION

Defendants respectfully request that the Court compel the discovery of the
information requested herein.

See Ex. G.
See, e.g., Ex. V.

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Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 19 of 69

Dated: September 22, 2014.

JCaboj«ii@perkinscoie.com \
Alexander W. Samuels
ASamuels@perkinscoie.com
2901 N. Central Avenue, Suite 2000
Phoenix, AZ 85012-2788
Telephone: 602.351.8000
Facsimile: 602.648.7000

Attorneys for Defendants Marc Turi and
Turi Defense Group ^

-19- NO. 14-CR-00191-DGC

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Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 20 of 69

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on September 22, 2014, an ORIGINAL and ONE COPY of the
attached was filed with the Clerk of the Court and that a COPY was sent via U.S. Mail to:

David A. Pimsner
Kristen Brook
U.S. Attorney's Office
40 North Central Avenue, Suite 1200
Phoenix, Arizona 85004^-\

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-20-

NO. 14-CR-00191-DGC

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 21 of 69

Exhibit A

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 22 of 69

Deparbnent of Justice

United States Attorney
District of Arizona

Two Renaissance Square Main: (602)514-7500

40 N. Ceaitral Ave., Suite 1200 Main Fax: (602) 5 14-7693
Phoenix, AZ 85004-4408

September 15,2014

Jean-Jacques Cabou
Alexander W. Samuels
Perkins Coie

2901 N. Central Avenue, Suite 2000
Phoenix, AZ 85012-2788

Re: United States v. Marc Turi and Turi Defense Group
CI144.0191^X-DGG (DKDJi

Dear Mr. Cabou and Mr. Samuels:

I have been advised that at the last hearing, Judge Campbell directed you to
submit to our office an updated request for Rule 16 discovery. It is my understanding
thatiudge Campbell indicated that your request should be tailored to those items which
bore some relevance and materiality to the allegations of the Indictment pursuant to
Fed. R. Gritn. P. 16(a)(l)(E)(i). We are in receipt of your letter dated September 8,
2014, in which you essentially renew, with some modifications, your previously
submitted request for discovery that was contained in your letter dated August, 6, 2014,

We have disclosed all known evidence and material involving the charges ts
Ihey relate to your client ^s attempt to broker an arms deal with the TNG rebels. This
included over 5,000 pages of discovery and two hard drives containing the results of
search warrants which were executed on various email accounts as well as at your
client's residence, IncUided In the discovery is the knovm email exchange between your
client and the late Ambassador Stevens. If any other email exchanges are discoveied,
that relate to this attempt to broker an arms transaction with the TNC rebels, they will
also be promptly disclosed. Likewise, if any other new evidence that is material and
relevant to this transaction is discovered, we will promptly disclose.

In your current letter requesting discovery, you actually expaind the scope of
your discovery requests for classified information from four categories to eight. Wliile
you do pair down by two the number of primary countries covered in your request from
a total of six to four (Libya, Syria^ Qatar and the UAE), it appears you have actually
expanded the scope of what you are seeking in the form of classified information and
records, including a completely open ended request for any and all end use ceitificates,
for any person or entity, for any ti'ansaction since 2008, covering any country, for any
type of a defense aiticle for which the U,E Government provided what you term as
"covert" support.

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 23 of 69

Jean Jacques Cabou
Alexander Samuels
Septeniber 15, 2014
Page2

Simply put, we cannot agree that this expanded request for classified
information even remotely satisfies any degree of relevancy or materiality under either
the standard of Fed. R. Evid, 401 or that of Fed. R, Crim P. 16. We believe your
requests are overbroad and not related to the conduct alleged in the indictment.
Accordingly, your discovery requests will need to be addressed with the court.

As we have advised, the government is well aware of its discovery obligations
and we have conducted an CKtensive review of information at all relevant agencies of
the United States. The government found no information that could be at all relevant to
a public authority defense, to include any evidence by any public authority that
defendant was auttiorized to submit to the Department of State, Difectorate of Defense
Controls, applications containing false end users to obtain an approval/license to broker
arnas to individuals in Libya. If your client is claiming that he was authorized to submit
false end-user documents in this matter, we are requesting that he provide the name of
the authorizing individual so that the government may investigate the claim further.
Thank you.

Sincerely,

JOHN S. LEONARDO
States Attorney
Disfridt of^rizona

A.RIMSNER
Assistant United States Attorney

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 24 of 69

Exhibit B

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 25 of 69

Perkins
Coie

2901 N. Central Avenue, Suite 2000
Phoenix, AZ 85012-2788

Jean-Jacques Cabou phonE: 602.351.8000

PHONE: (602) 35 1 -8003 pax, 602.648.7000

FAX: (602) 648-7003 www.perkinscole.com
EMAIL: JCabou@perkinscoie.com

August 6, 2014

VIA EMAIL

David A. Pimsner
Kristen Brook

U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
40 North Central Avenue
Suite 1200

Phoenix, Arizona 85004

Re: Clskssified Discovery in United States V. Marc Turi
Cause No. OR 14.191-PHX-DGC

Dear David and Kristen:

As you know, we believe the production of classified or potentially classifiable
information will be necessary to defend our client, Marc Turi. As you also know, we have filed
a motion with the Court to set a pre-trial conference to discuss CIPA issues; Judge Campbell has
granted that motion and set a conference for August 22.

Although we have not yet been able to review the discovery you've provided in
significant detail, our initial review solidifies our view that classified or potentially classifiable
information will be at issue in this case. For example, in his July 22, 201 1 interview, Mr. Turi
discussed how the "agency" and "chiefs of station" were involved in some of his work. Some of
the investigative reports provided in the discovery detail transactions that may have involved
work Mr. Turi did with active members of U.S. intelligence agencies. See, e.g., U.S. v. Tun
000802.

In light of our ongoing concerns and these facts, we urge you to reconsider your previous
position that CIPA procedures will not be required here. In any event, however, m the interests
of full disclosure (and hopefiilly speeding up the process) I wanted to make you aware of the
type of information we are seeking. Accordingly, below is our first set of requests for classified
discovery These are by no means exhaustive; I'm sure more issues will anse as we review the

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ANCHOSAOe ■ BEIJING ■ BEILEVUE ■ BOISE ■ CHICAGO ■ DALLAS • DENVER LOS ANGELES • MADISON NEW YORK
PAIO ALTO . PHOENIX • PORTLAND • SAN DIEGO ■ SAN FRANCISCO ■ SEATTLE • SHANGHAI TAIPEI ■ W AS H I NC TON , DC .

Perkins Coie lu>

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 26 of 69

August 6, 2014
Page 2

discovery and the case progresses. We will supplement these requests as necessary. But I
wanted to get you this first request as soon as possible.

The documents that we request are discoverable, among other reasons, under the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), and its progeny, and Fed. R. Crim. P. 16. We ask that you provide the discovery
requested in this letter (including both classified and unclassified responsive documents) and
advise us of any specific requests with which the government declines to comply. To the extent
the government has already produced documents responsive to these requests, it is not necessary
that those documents be produced again. We will be glad to meet with you to discuss the
requests and attempt to resolve any differences we might have. These requests do not limit or
modify requests already made or to be made in the fiiture.

The documents' requested include not only documents in the possession, custody, or
control of your office and the Department of Justice, but also (a) documents in the possession,
custody, or control of any agency, organization, group, or individual allied with, or assisting in
any way, the United States in this matter, including all agencies, departments, agents and/or
employees of the United States, the FBI, the CIA, the Department of Homeland Security or the
Department of State (collectively the "United States") and (b) all other documents of which your
office and the Department of Justice have knowledge and/or to which they have access. See,
e g. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995); United States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 893-94
(9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1501-05 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States
V. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Poindexter, 111 F. Supp. 1470,
1477-78 (D.D.C. 1989).

DOCUMENT REQUESTS

While there is no obligation for us to explain here our rationale in seeking the requested
documents, in an effort to minimize needless disputes and explain why we so strongly believe
the disclosure of classified or potentially classifiable information is necessary here, I do so
briefly below. I believe the requested documents are relevant and potentially exculpatory.

' The word "Documents" includes all books, papers, letters, correspondence, e-mails,
notebooks, reports, memoranda, studies, diaries, notes, messages, computer facilitated or
transmitted materials, images, photographs, information in any computer database, audio and
video tapes, recordings, transcripts, ledgers, printouts, and all copies or portions thereof, and any
other written, recorded, or memorialized material of any nature whatsoever.

As used in this letter, the words "and" and "or" mean "and/or," and the words "includes"
and "including" mean "includes (or including) without limitation."

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August 6, 2014
Page 3

particularly given Mr. Turi's intent to notice and aggressively pursue a public authority defense
in this case. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.3.^

I) Any documents or other evidence relating to instances in which the United States assisted
or considered assisting in any way, overtly or covertly, in the transportation, provision,
acquisition, transfer, or transport of Defense Articles'' to or from any person, entity, group
of people, quasi-governmental entity, or government within the territory of Libya, Syria,
Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, or Jordan (these countries collectively here the
"Covered Countries") within the timeframe of 20 1 0 to the date of this request.

a. The Covered Countries are included in this request for the following reasons,
among others:

i. Libya, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates: These are obviously die
countries involved in the documents at the center of this case.
Additionally, we have a good-faith basis to believe that Defense Articles
eventually did covertly enter Libya from Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates and that the United States may have been involved.'*

^ We are informed, and therefore believe, that certain documents may be within the
personal control of agents and employees of the United States even though not stored in an
official repository. For example, "gmails" to or from such people even though not stored on
government email servers. These requests specifically include and are not limited to such
documents.

^ As used in this letter and any subsequent letters, "Defense Articles" means items included
in the United States Munitions List. See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1.

* See. e.g.. United Nations Security Council Final Report of the Panel of Experts
Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) Concerning Libya, available at
http://www.securitvcounctlreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s 2014 106.pdf (last accessed Jul. 24, 2014); J. Risen, Mark Mazzetti, and
M. Schmidt, U.S -Approved Arms for Libya Rebels Fell Into Jihadis' Hands, New York Times
(Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://www.nvtimes.com/20 1 2/ 1 2/06/world/africa /weaDons-sent-to-
libvan-rebels-with-us-approval-fell-into-islamist-hands.html?pagewanted=all& r=0 (last
accessed Aug. 5, 2014). Senator McCain has publicly stated that the United States helped arm
the Libyan rebels. See McCain Falsely Claims U.S. Armed Libya Rebels to Make the Case for
Arming Syrians, Think Progress (June 15, 2012), available at
http://thinkprogress.org/securitv/20 1 2/06/1 5/500433/mccain-arm s-rebels-libva-svria/ (last
accessed Aug. 5, 2014).

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ii. Syria, Turkey, and Jordan: We have a good-faith basis to believe the
United States was similarly involved in covertly procuring weapons that
entered Syria through Turkey and Jordan in an arrangement very similar to
the Qatar/UAE/Libya arrangement^

2) Any documents or other evidence relating to involvement or contemplated involvement
by the United States in any transaction, or series of transactions, discussed in the United
Nations Security Council (or its experts, investigators, or staff) relating to that body's
Final Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011)
Concerning Libya.^

a. Any documents or evidence relating to the United States' participation or refusal
to participate in that United Nations Security Council investigation.

3) All prior approval requests (and subsequent approvals, denials, and RWAs) for brokering
activity relating to the Covered Countries for Defense Articles from 2010 to the date of
this request.

4) Any licenses or other approvals eventually granted for the transactions referenced in
Request 3.

The Sixth Amendment ensures Mr. Turi, among other things, a "meaningful opportunity
to present a complete defense." Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006). And the
right to due process in a criminal trial "is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend

^ See, e.g., G. Miller & J. Warrick, CIA Preparing to Deliver Rebels Arms Through Turkey
and Jordan, Washington Post (June 14, 2013), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/worid/nationai-securitv/cia-preparing-to-deliver -rebels-arms-
through-turkev-and-iordan/2Q13/Q6/14/e38dabf2-d522-1 Ie2-a73e-826d299ff459 storv.html (last
accessed Aug. 5, 2014); M. Hosenball, Exclusive: Obama Authorizes Secret U.S. Support for
Syrian Rebels, Reuters (Aug. 1, 2012), available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/20 1 2/08/0 1/us-usa-svria-obama-order-

idUSBRE870 1 OK20 1 2080 1 (last accessed Aug. 5, 2014); K. De Young & L. Sly, Syrian Rebels
Get Influx of Arms with Gulf Neighbors' Money. U.S. Coordination, Washington Post (May 15,
2012), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/worid/national-s ecuritv/svrian-rebels-get-
influx-of-arms-with-gulf-neighbors-monev-us-

coordination/2012/05/1 5/gIOAds2TSU storv.html (last accessed Aug. 5, 2014).

* See United Nations Security Council Final Report of the Panel of Experts Established
Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) Concerning Libya, available at
htt p://www.securitvcouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B- 6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s 2014 106.pdf (last accessed Jul. 24, 2014).

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against the State's accusations." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). The
documents requested above are critical to Mr. Turi's exercise of these rights. We look forward
to working with you to establish a procedure for, and to carry out, the efficient delivery of the
information we have requested here.

Sincerely,

Jean- Jacques Cabou

JJC:lm

LEOAL122845089.3

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Exhibit C

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 31 of 69

Jean-lacques Cabou

phone; (602)351-8003

FAX: (602)648-7003

BMAIL: JCabou@perkinscoie.com

July 31, 2014

VIA EMAIL AND U.S. MAIL

David A. Pimsner
Kristen Brook

U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
40 North Central Avenue
Suite 1200

Phoenix, Arizona 85004

Re: Discovery in United States v. Marc Turi
Cause No. 14-cr-00191-l-DGC

Dear David and Kristen:

As you know I have recently been appointed to represent Mr. Turi. I know that you have
already prepared the production of some discovery; the speed with which you did so is much
appreciated. In an abundance of caution, however, and pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and other applicable authority, the
defendant requests discovery. To the extent the government has already produced documents
responsive to these requests, it is not necessary that those documents be produced again. We will
be glad to meet with you to discuss the requests and attempt to resolve any differences we might
have. We reserve the right to supplement these requests as the case progresses. These requests
do not limit or modify requests already made or to be made in the future.

The government's obligation to provide Rule 16 discovery extends to all materials of
which the prosecutor knows and to which he or she has access. See United States v. Bryan, 868
F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1989). The prosecutor is deemed to have knowledge of and access to
anything in the possession, custody or control of any federal or cooperating non-federal agency
participating in the same investigation of the defendant. Id. Therefore, please consult with all
such agencies in preparing your discovery response.

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Consistent with that obligation, the documents' requested include not only documents in
the possession, custody, or control of your office and the Department of Justice, but also
(a) documents in the possession, custody, or control of any agency, organization, group, or
individual allied with, or assisting in any way, the United States in this matter, including all
agencies, departments, agents and/or employees of the United States, the FBI, the CIA, the
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense (including but not limited to the
Defense Criminal Investigative Service "DCIS"), and the Department of State (collectively the
"United States") and (b) all other documents of which your office and the Department of Justice
have knowledge and/or to which they have access. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437
(1995); United States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Brooks,
966 F.2d 1500, 1501-05 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 74 (D.C. Cir.
1976); United States v. Poindexter, 121 F. Supp. 1470, 1477-78 (D.D.C. 1989).

Pursuant to Brady v Maryland, 373 U.S. 82 (1963), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
(1977) and United States v. Agurs, All U.S. 97 (1976), the defendant is entitled to discover all
information of whatever form, source, or nature which tends to exculpate the defendant, either
through an indication of the defendant's innocence or through the potential impeachment of any
witness for the government. The defendant's right extends to information that is favorable to
him on Guidelines sentencing issues. United States v. Weintraub, 871 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th
Cir. 1989).

This request includes, but is not limited to, the following:

• The criminal record, if any, of any witnesses whom the government intends to
rely upon at trial.

• Any information concerning any government witnesses' history of alcohol or drug
abuse or addiction.

• All promises and inducements, formal or informal, written or oral, made by
attorneys and/or agents of federal, state, or local government to any witness, or
any other party known to the government to any witness or other person with
respect to cooperating, providing information and/or testifying in any proceeding
related to this case (grand jury or trial), including but not limited to:

The word "documents" includes all books, papers, letters, correspondence, e-mails,
notebooks, reports, memoranda, studies, diaries, notes, messages, computer facilitated or
transmitted materials, images, photographs, information in any computer database, audio and
video tapes, recordings, transcripts, ledgers, printouts, and all copies or portions thereof, and any
other written, recorded, or memorialized material of any nature whatsoever.

As used in this letter, the words "and" and "or" mean "and/or," and the words "includes"
and "including" mean "includes (or including) without limitation."

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o rewards, monetary or otherwise;

o employment;

o protection and relocation;

o the rejection, dismissal, immunization from prosecution or reduction of
any federal, state, or local offense charged in the past or present or that
might be charged in the future; and

o reduction of sentence, improvement of custody status or leniency at
sentencing by making the witnesses' cooperation known to the
prosecution, Court, probation or parole officer, or other federal, state or
local agency or jurisdiction.

• Information concerning other cases in which a witness has cooperated with the
government in return for any of the above forms of consideration or
compensation.

• Any information concerning any prior statements or bad acts reflecting on any
government witnesses' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.

• The names and addresses of all witnesses to the charged offenses whom the
government does not intend to call at trial, or whose testimony may be favorable
to the defense. United States v. Cadet, 121 F.2d 1453, 1468-69 (9th Cir. 1984).

• Any evidence or testimony gathered during the investigation of this case, or
during the investigation of other matters involving witnesses for the government
in this case, that impeaches or contradicts the testimony and evidence to be
offered against the defendant. For example, the defendant requests discovery of
conflicting statements of witnesses given to law enforcement and prosecutorial
officials.

• Any information concerning any government witnesses' history of psychological,
psychiatric or emotional disorders and counseling, which may bear on his or her
ability to perceive or relate events accurately and truthfully. This includes, but is
not limited to, information on drug, alcohol, or other addiction.

• The defendant hereby demands production of the personnel files of all law
enforcement officers and government employees whom the government intends to
call as witnesses at trial. Please review those files, and provide me with any
information that may be material to the defense, including without limitation.

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Page 4 •

evidence of perjurious conduct or dishonesty. United States v. Henthorn, 931
F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1991).

• Any written or recorded statements made by the defendant, or copies thereof,
within the possession, custody or control of the government or any of its agents.
Rule 16(a)(1)(A).

• That portion of any written record containing the substance of any relevant oral
statement made by the defendant. Rule 16(a)(1)(A).

• The substance of any oral statement made by the defendant which the government
intends to use at the trial. Rule 16(a)(1).

• Recorded testimony of the defendant before a grand jury which relates to the
offense charged. Rule 16(a)(1)(A).

• All handwritten notes or other rough notes made by government agents while
interviewing the defendant. Rule 16(a)(1)(A); United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d
1247 (9th Cir. 1976).

• Defendant's prior criminal record the existence of which is known, or by the
exercise of due diligence may become known to the government, including, but
not limited to, photocopy of NCIC or DAC records or a verbatim rendition of its
content. Rule 16(a)(1)(B).

• Copies of or an opportunity to inspect and copy or photograph all books, papers,
documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places which are within
the possession, custody or control of the government or any of its agents, and
which are material to the preparation of defendant's defense or to his sentencing
under the Guidelines, or which the government intends to use as evidence in chief
at trial, or which were obtained from or belong to the defendant. Rule
16(a)(1)(C).

• Copies of or an opportunity to inspect and copy or photograph any results or
reports of physical or mental examinations, or of scientific tests or experiments
related to or made in connection with, the above-captioned case known to the
government, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known to the
government. Rule 16(a)(1)(D).

• Notice of the government's intention to use (in its evidence in chief at trial) any
evidence which the defendant may be entitled to discover under Rule 16. I will

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rely upon that list in determining whether to file any motions to suppress
evidence. Rule 12(d)(2).

• A written summary of any expert whom the government intends to call at trial or
sentencing, including name, area of expertise, qualifications, opinions, and the
basis and the reasons therefore. Rule 16(a)(1)(E). The Advisory Committees'
note on this Rule, at paragraph 6, states, in part:

o The amendment requires a summary of the basis relied upon by the expert.
That should cover not only written and oral reports, tests, and
investigations, but any information that might be recognized as a
legitimate basis for an opinion under Federal Rule of Evidence 703,
including opinions of other experts.

o This information will enable the defendant to determine in advance of trial
whether he needs to obtain expert assistance in preparing his defense.
United States v. Barrett, 703 F.2d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 1983); Rule
16(a)(1)(E). Additionally, if the government makes a request under Rule
I6(b)(l)(C)(ii), the defendant hereby requests a written summary of
testimony the government intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 as
evidence at trial on the issue of the defendant's mental condition.

• Reasonable notice of any evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts," or
convictions, that the government intends to introduce at trial for whatever reason
pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 609. Please provide me with
the nature of any such acts.

• Pursuant to United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1976), please have all
government agents, whether federal, state, local or tribal, preserve any and all
handwritten notes of witness interviews or investigations for possible use at trial
as Jencks Act material, and for in camera inspection by the Court for possible
Brady material. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 82 (1963).

• Any documents relating to, summarizing, or evidencing the costs of investigation
of this matter, including itemized receipts, itineraries, etc. for all travel expenses
incurred by employees or agents of the United States in this investigation.

• Any documents relating to, summarizing, or evidencing the role of the FBI,
including the names of specific FBI agents, if any, who participated in the
assessment of Marc Turi's offer to provide Foreign Intelligence ("FI")
information under Part 792.

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• Any documents relating to the requests for prior approval relevant to this case,
including, but not limited to:

o All communications at the State Department - Directorate of Defense
Trade Controls (DDTC) - associated with Case Numbers BA-L079-11,
BA-L085-11, BA-LllO-11, and BA-L189-11 from March to September
2011.

o All communications at the State Department - Bureau of Political Military
Affairs Regional Security and Arms Transfers (PM/RSAT) - associated
with Case Numbers BA-L079-11, BA-L085-11, BA-Ll 10-11, and BA-
LI 89-1 1 from March to September 201 1 .

o All communications at the State Department - Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs (NEA) - associated with Case Numbers BA-L079-11, BA-L085-
II, BA-Ll 10-1 1, and BA-Ll 89-1 1 from March to September 201 1.

o All communications at the State Department - Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor Affairs (DRL) - associated with Case Numbers
BA-L079-1 1, BA-L085-11, BA-Ll 10-1 1, and BA-L189-1 1 from March to
September 2011.

o All communications at the Department of Defense (DoD), including but
not limited to communications with the applicable DoD desk officer,
associated with Case Numbers BA-L079-11, BA-L085-11, BA-Ll 10-11,
and BA-Ll 89-1 1 from March to September 201 1.

o All communications associated with State Department DDTC Licensing
System (EUie) associated with Case Numbers BA-L079- 1 1 , BA-L085-1 1 ,
B A-L 1 1 0- 1 1 , and B A-L 1 89- 1 1 from March to September 2011.

o All communications associated with PM/RSAT former Assistant Secretary
of State Andrew Shapiro associated with Case Numbers BA-L079-11,
BA-L085-11, B A-L 11 0-11, and BA-Ll 89- 11 from March to September
2011.

o All communications associated with Director of Defense Trade Controls
licensing Kevin Maloney associated with Case Numbers BA-L079-11,
BA-L085-11, BA-Ll 10-11, and BA-L189-11 from March to September
2011.

I realize, of course, that it will take some time for the Government and its various
agencies to collect this information. I would appreciate you confirming by August 7, 2014,

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Page 7

however, (1) that the Government is seeking the information I have requested and (2) the date
upon which I can expect to be provided with this information.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Jean- Jacques Cabou

JJC:lm

LEGAL122850890.2

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Exhibit D

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 39 of 69

Jean- Jacques Cabou

PHONE: (602)351-8003

fax: (602)648-7003

EMAIL: JCabou@perkinscoie.com

Septembers, 2014

VIA EMAIL

A. William Mackie
Department of Justice
National Security Division
600 E Street, NW
1 0th Floor - Bicentennial Bldg
Washington, DC 20530

David A. Pimsner
Kristen Brook

U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
40 North Central Avenue
Suite 1200

Phoenix, Arizona 85004

Re: Classifled Discovety in United States v. Marc Turi
Cause No. CR 14-191-PHX-DGC

Dear Will, David, and Kristen:

As you know. Judge Campbell asked us at the September 3 hearing to provide you with
an updated request for classified discovery. Following the hearing, we have again reviewed the
relevant authorities governing the scope of discovery, especially in the context of a public
authority defense like Defendants' here. We have also continued our factual investigation. Put
simply, we continue to firmly believe that a significant amount of classified information must be
produced to us by the Government in this case. We are certain that discoverable, classified
information exists. We are not, of course, certain of the quantum of such information, the exact
form of such information, or of its precise location, but we know it exists. And we again
respectfully request that it be produced.

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At the outset, it's important to note our belief that the requested documents are
discoverable not just under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16, but also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
and its progeny. The discussion here, however, focuses primarily on Rule 16 given its broader
reach. Rule 16(a)(l)(E)(i) requires the disclosure of any item "material to preparing the
defense." "A defendant must make a threshold showing of materiality, which requires a
presentation of facts which would tend to show that the Government is in possession of
information helpful to the defense." United States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 1995)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Again, our investigation makes us certain that
the Government is in possession of such information in this case.

"Materiality is a low threshold; it is satisfied so long as the information" would help the
Defendants prepare their defense. United States v. Hernandez-Meza, 720 F.3d 760, 768 (9th Cir.
2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although Defendants must identify how
the information is relevant to their defense, "[a] defendant needn't spell out his theory of the case
in order to obtain discovery. Nor is the government entitled to know in advance specifically
what the defense is going to be." Id. at 768. Rather, Defendants need only make a sufficient
showing of materiality, a low threshold that the Ninth Circuit has linked to Fed. R. Evid. 40rs
relevance standard. See United States v. Stever, 603 F.3d 747, 753 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
evidence should have been produced pursuant to Rule 16(a)(l)(E)(i) if it had '"any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable that it would be without the evidence'" (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401)).

"Information that is not exculpatory or impeaching may still be relevant to developing a
possible defense." United States v. Muniz-Jaquez, 718 F.3d 1 180, 1 183 (9th Cir. 2013). In fact,
even if the documents requested would undercut Defendants' purported defense, they would
nonetheless be discoverable. See United States v. Doe, 705 F.3d 1134, 1151 (9th Cir. 2013)
("Even if the documents [requested under Rule 16] caused [defendant] to completely abandon
[his] entrapment defense and take an entirely different path, the documents would still have been
'material to preparing the defense' under Rule 16(a)(l)(E)(i)."). "A defendant who knows that
the government has evidence that renders his planned defense useless can alter his trial strategy.
Or he can seek a plea agreement instead of going to trial." Muniz-Jaquez, 718 F.3d at 1 183.

Given the facts here, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Stever is particularly instructive. 603
F.3d 747. There, the defendant was charged with various crimes relating to growing marijuana.
Id. at 750. He "sought to defend on the ground that the marijuana growing operation found on an
isolated comer of his mother's 400-acre property was the work of one of the Mexican drug
trafficking organizations (DTOs) that had recently infiltrated Oregon." Id.

Stever filed a Motion to Compel Discovery, seeking "any reports in the government's
possession describing the 'characteristics, modus operandi, and other information regarding'
Mexican DTOs involved in growing marijuana." Id. at 751. In support of his request, he "drew
upon news reports, publically available information," and other documents "to argue that

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Mexican DTOs had recently infiltrated Eastern Oregon" and "that the operation on Stever's
property bore several distinctive characteristics of Mexican DTO operations." Id. (emphasis
added). Stever also proffered an expert who could testify regarding the modus operandi of DTO
operations. Id. at 752.

The district court denied the Motion to Compel. The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed
Stever's convictions, holding that the district court erred in denying the motion even under a
deferential abuse of discretion standard of review. Id. at 753. In doing so, the court emphasized
the low threshold standards of materiality and relevance.

As in Stever, Defendants here have identified a specific defense and have enumerated
specific types of evidence material to that defense. Also like Stever, Defendants provided in
their August 6 letter and provide again below publicly available documents indicating the
existence of such evidence. Moreover, as in Stever, Defendants here could, as part of a
"presentation of 'facts which would tend to show that the Government is in possession of
information helpful to the defense,'" Santiago, 46 F.3d at 894 (citation omitted), present or
proffer the testimony of highly credible expert witnesses.

As part of the ongoing defense investigation of this case, we have become aware of, and
have personally interviewed, multiple individuals with irrefutably credible experience in the
business of covert arms dealing for the U.S. Government. Among other material topics, these
witnesses could testify that Defendants' actions here are consistent with a U.S.-backed, CIA-
involved, covert transaction. Simply put, whether the United States supported an arms
transaction in Libya during the relevant time period, and how it supports covert arms transactions
in general, are highly relevant to Defendants' public authority defense.

With this legal framework and background in mind. Defendants make the following
discovery requests. As noted in our previous letter, the documents' requested include not only
documents in the possession, custody, or control of your office and the Department of Justice,
but also (a) documents in the possession, custody, or control of any agency, organization, group,
or individual allied with, or assisting in any way, the United States in this matter, including all
agencies, departments, agents and/or employees of the United States, the FBI, the CIA, the
Department of Homeland Security or the Department of State (collectively the "United States")
and (b) all other documents of which your office and the Department of Justice have knowledge

The word "Documents" includes all books, papers, letters, correspondence, e-mails,
notebooks, reports, memoranda, studies, diaries, notes, messages, computer facilitated or
transmitted materials, images, photographs, information in any computer database, audio and
video tapes, recordings, transcripts, ledgers, printouts, and all copies or portions thereof, and any
other written, recorded, or memorialized material of any nature whatsoever.

As used in this letter, the words "and" and "or" mean "and/or," and the words "includes"
and "including" mean "includes (or including) without limitation."

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and/or to which they have access.^ See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995);
Santiago, 46 F.3d at 893-94; United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1501-05 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
United States v. Haldetnan, 559 F.2d 31, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Poindexter, 111 F.
Supp. 1470, 1477-78 (D.D.C. 1989). We continue to believe that the requests made in our
August 6 letter were sufficiently narrow to trigger a production duty under Rule 16. We further
believe that the requested information is discoverable under Brady and its progeny without any
defense request whatsoever. Nonetheless, we have attempted to further narrow our requests in
an effort to reach an agreement for now without the need for the court's intervention.

DOCUMENT REQUESTS

1) Any documents within the possession, custody or control of the Central Intelligence
Agency containing the names Marc Turi or Turi Defense Group. This request includes
specifically, but is not limited to:

a. Documents held, received, or created by the Near East Division (the "NE
Division") of the Directorate of Operations (the Clandestine Service) of the CIA
in the NE Division's "Memorandum Database."

b. Documents held, received, or created by the Office of Covert Procurement.

c. Accounting, banking, or other financial records reflecting or related in any way to
the payment of funds to Marc Turi or Turi Defense Group. ^

2) Any documents or other evidence relating to instances in which the United States assisted
or considered assisting in the covert transportation, provision, acquisition, transfer, or
transport of Defense Articles* to or from any person, entity, group of people, quasi-

We are informed, and therefore believe, that certain documents may be within the
personal control of agents and employees of the United States even though not stored in an
official repository. For example, "gmails" to or from such people even though not stored on
government email servers. These requests specifically include and are not limited to such
documents.

Because Mr. Turi received such funds and because such records are required to be
maintained by law, including for the purposes of congressional oversight, we are certain that
such records exist.

As used in this letter and any subsequent letters, "Defense Articles" means items included
in the United States Munitions List. See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1.

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govemmentai entity, or government within the territory of Libya within the timeframe of
2010 to the date of this request.

a. This includes, but it is certainly not limited to, prior approval requests, approvals,
denials. Returns Without Action ("RWAs"), licenses, and other approvals granted
for any such transaction. It also includes the Covert Action Findings authorizing
the program pursuant to which such covert actions were undertaken.

b. The basis for this request is a much-more-than-good-faith belief that the United
States did covertly assist in the procurement and/or transportation of arms for
individuals and/or entities in Libya pursuant to a Covert Action Finding issued by
the President.^ Defendants have noticed their intent to use a public authority
defense. One prong of that defense will be that, during the relevant time frame.
Defendants were acting at U.S. Government direction and consistent with U.S.
Government interests. The Covert Action Finding(s) in effect at this time, and
whether the United States covertly supported the arming of individuals and/or
entities in Libya have a tendency to make the facts underlying Defendants'
proffered defense "more probable or less probable than [they] would be without
the evidence." Stever, 603 F.3d at 753 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 401). So does the
manner in which that transaction or series of transactions occurred.

3) Any documents or other evidence relating to instances in which the United States assisted
or considered assisting in the covert transportation, provision, acquisition, transfer, or
transport of Defense Articles to or from any person, entity, group of people, quasi-
governmental entity, or government within the territory of Qatar and/or the United Arab
Emirates within the timeframe of 2010 to the date of this request.

See, e.g.. United Nations Security Council Final Report of the Panel of Experts
Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) Concerning Libya (Feb. 15, 2014), available at
http://www.securitvcouncilreport.org/attycf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s 2014 106.pdf (last accessed July 24, 2014) ("U.N. Final Report");
James Risen, Mark Mazzetti, and Michael S. Schmidt, U.S.-Approved Arms for Libya Rebels
Fell Into Jihadis' Hands, New York Times (Dec. 5, 2012), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/Q6/world/africa/weapons-sent-to-ilbvan-rebels-with-us-
approval-feli-into-islamist-hands.html?pagcwanted=aH& r=^0 (last accessed Aug. 5, 2014).
Senator McCain has publicly stated that the United States helped arm the Libyan rebels. See Ali
Gharib, McCain Falsely Claims U.S. Armed Libya Rebels to Make the Case for Arming Syrians,
Think Progress (June 15, 2012), available at

http://thinkprogress.org/securitv/2012/06/15/500433/mccain-arms-rebels-libva-syria/ (last
accessed Aug. 5, 2014).

LEGAL 1 23407669.4

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Septembers, 2014
Page 6

a. This includes, but it is certainly not limited to, prior approval requests, approvals,
denials, RWAs, licenses, and other approvals granted for any such transaction. It
also includes the Covert Action Findings authorizing the program pursuant to
which such covert actions were undertaken.

b. The basis for this request is largely the same as the basis for Request 2.
Publically available materials suggest that Libyan and/or Syrian rebels were
armed, pursuant to a Covert Action Finding signed by the President, with the
cooperation of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. If the United States assisted
in that effort, and used the same two countries at issue in this case, that has a
tendency to make the facts underlying Defendants' proffered defense "more
probable or less probable than [they] would be without the evidence." Stever, 603
F.3d at 753 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 401). And again, the manner in which any such
transaction was conducted, not just the transaction's existence or non-existence, is
material to the defense.

4) Any documents or other evidence relating to instances in which the United States assisted
or considered assisting in the covert transportation, provision, acquisition, transfer, or
transport of Defense Articles to or from any person, entity, group of people, quasi-
governmental entity, or government within the territory of Syria within the timeframe of
2010 to the date of this request.

a. This includes, but it is certainly not limited to, prior approval requests, approvals,
denials, RWAs, licenses, and other approvals granted for any such transaction. It
also includes the Covert Action Findings authorizing the program pursuant to
which such covert actions were undertaken.

b. The basis for this request is a much-more-than-good-faith belief that the United
States covertly assisted in the procurement and/or transportation of arms for
individuals and/or entities in Syria.^ Publically available documents suggest this

See, e.g., Greg Miller & Joby Warrick, CIA Preparing to Deliver Rebels Arms Through
Turkey and Jordan, Washington Post (June 14, 2013), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-securitv/cia-preparing-to-deliver-rebels-arms-
through-turkev-and-iordan/201 3/06/14/e38dabf2-d522-l Ie2-a73e-826d299ff459 storv.html (last
accessed Aug. 5, 2014); Mark Hosenball, Exclusive: Obama Authorizes Secret U.S. Support for
Syrian Rebels, Reuters (Aug. 1, 2012), available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/20 1 2/08/0 1/us-usa-syria-obama-order-

idUSBRE8701QK20120801 (last accessed Aug. 5, 2014); Karen De Young & Liz Sly, Syrian
Rebels Get Influx of Arms with Gulf Neighbors ' Money, U.S. Coordination, Washington Post
(May 15, 2012), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/syrian-

LEGAL123407669.4

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September 8, 2014
Page 7

transaction was executed in much the same way as the Libya transaction, by using
partner countries within the region as middle-men, with the U.S. providing only
logistical support. The manner in which the U.S. typically conducts covert arms
transactions is highly material to the defense. Here, we have a good-faith belief
that evidence exists of one such transaction that bears high levels of similarity to
the one alleged in this case.

5) Any documents or other evidence relating to involvement or contemplated involvement
by the United States in any transaction, or series of transactions, discussed in the United
Nations Security Council (or its experts, investigators, or staff) relating to that body's
Final Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011)
Concerning Libya.^ This includes, but it is certainly not limited to, prior approval
requests, approvals, denials, RWAs, licenses, and other approvals granted for any such
transaction.

a. This request may well be duplicative, as this transaction may be covered by
Requests 2 and 3. To the extent it is not, however, it is material to the defense for
the same reasons identified in those requests.

6) Any documents or evidence relating to the United States' participation or refusal to
participate in that United Nations Security Council investigation.

a. Again, it is material to the defense to know whether the U.S. covertly supported
the shipment of arms into Libya, particularly if through Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates. Evidence of any participation or refusal to participate in this UN
investigation would help aid in the preparation of the defense and, ultimately,
would help the jury in this case determine what, if any, involvement the U.S. had.

7) Any end user certificates used in transactions from 2008 to present that received covert
U.S. Government support where, because of a covert action, the end user listed on the
end user certificate is not the end user intended by the U.S. Government or CIA.

a. Defendants have a much-more-than-good faith belief, both through publicly
available documents and through highly credible investigative interviews, that the
U.S. often covertly supports arms transactions in which arms are transshipped
through an intermediary and/or where, because of a covert action, the end user
listed on the end user certificate is not the end user intended by the U.S.

rebels-get-influx-of-arms-with-gult-neighbors-money-us-
coordination/2Q12/05/15/glQAds2TSU storv.html (last accessed Aug. 5, 2014).

' See U.N. Final Report (note 5, supra)..

LEGAL123407669.4

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 46 of 69

Septembers, 2014
Pages

Government or CIA. ^ Documents relating to those transactions, particularly
during the time frame Defendants have been in this business, bear directly on
Defendants' proposed defense. The defense is unable to further narrow this
request to identify specific transactions (other than those identified in Requests 2-
5) as it cannot know of specific deals done pursuant to such an arrangement given
their covert nature.

8) Any communications or other evidence relating to the Spring 2011 email
communications between Defendants and Christopher Stevens.

a. Emails to Defendants suggest that Ambassador Stevens intended to take some
further action with the State Department regarding Defendants' role in attempting
to arm the Libyan rebels. Other evidence confirms that Ambassador Stevens was
made aware of Defendants' proposed transaction. ^ Any subsequent
communications within the Government about this transaction (including, but not
limited to. Defendants' involvement in it), or other evidence generated as a result
thereof, is directly relevant to whether the Government was working with
Defendants on any such transaction.

We hope that these further narrowed requests satisfy your concerns and that we can reach
an agreement for the production of the requested discovery. Per Judge Campbell's ordered
schedule, we look forward to hearing back from you regarding these requests by September 15.

Sincerely,

Jean- Jacques Cabou

JJC:lm

* See, e.g.. Ken Silverstein, Licensed to Kill, Harper's Magazine (May 1, 2000) (detailing
how arms dealer Ernst Werner Glatt worked with the U.S. covertly for decades and frequently
was required to use end user certificates stating false end users in such transactions), attached
hereto for convenience. Defendants are further prepared, as described previously in this letter, to
proffer expert testimony along these lines if necessary.

^ See U.S. V. Turi 005769 (6/14/1 1 email from A. Yfantis to Y. Adam and M. Turi stating
that "MR STEVENS THE AMERICAN EMBASSEDOR IN BENGHAZI HAS BEEN
INFORMED OF THE ARRANGEMENT .... AND THINGS SHOULD BE OK").

LEGAL123407669.4

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 47 of 69

Exhibit E

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 48 of 69

R IP O t T

LIGEMSED TO KILL

Shadowing our government's favorite arms dealer
By Ken SUverstein

"Vote! Bah.' When yni vote, ym ardy
change the names of t/ic cabinet. When
you shoot, you ptil down gavemrr^nts,
imugurate new epochs. dioUsh old or-
ders cmi set up nm. "

— ^Andrew Undershaft, the
munitions magnate of George
Bernard Shaw's Ma/or Barhara

"Arms dealers provide the grease that
mikes foreign policy work. If you re gp'
ing to have a covert war someuh^e,
somebody has to provide the buiieu."
— John Miley, former weapons

Adea ler for the CI A
t the foothills of the Blue
Ridge Mountains, about twenty
miles south of Charlottesville, sits
Nelson County, one of Virginia's
tnost bucolic comers. Unimpeded by
a single traffic light, the main thor-
oughfare is Route 56, a two-lane
country road that wends among
vineyards, orchards, and farms. The
rolling landscape draws plenty of
weekenders, who come to take in
Crabtree Falls, the highest waterfall
east of the Mississippi, and to stop by
the Walton's Mountain Museum,
which celebrates the aeries that
brought John-Boy and his family to
mifliore of TV' viewers.
Despite this nod to good plain folk,

Ken Shemein is a contribumig editor of Harp-
er's Magazine. His fast crocie, "The iJa-
duxtctive Boy ScoM." appemed tn the No-
wmter 1998 issue, Hh investifptionm on
the firms tmk for Harper's hasledtxia bmA,
Private Warriors, whkk beptiiiMi tte
June by Vena.

Nelson County seems destined to be
overtaken by the horsy set and car-
petbagging celebrities as they push
south into Falwell country. Nelson is
still cheaper than Ctiarlottesville or
Middleburg, but new money is at-
traaed by dte Wintergreen ski resort
and ^ctacular estates such as Level
Green, built in 1803 for the Revolu-
tionary War leader Major Thomas
M^sie, and Bellevette (pronounced
"believe it"), constructed fifty years
earlier by Charles Rose on land grant-
ed to his family by King George II.
Across the Tye River from Bellevette
lies Markham Farm, a plot of land
once held by a granddaughter of
Thomas Jefferson's. Markham Farm
has changed hands many times, most
recently in 1980, when it was bought
by a German named Ernst Werner
Glatt He subsequently purchased ad-
joining lands and turned the estate,
valued in 1994 at $2.4 million, into a
modem sheep farm. The entrance to
Glatt's farm from Route 56 is an-
nounced by a sign that sports a
crowned black eagle, a symbol hear-
kening back to imperial Prussia and
the past of the farm's owner, who as a
teenager fought in the Nazi army.

Given Nelson County's boutique
intimacy, mcKt ti^idents have heard
of GkK and his Black Eagle Farm,
but few seem to have pondered the
sign's meaning or know much about
their neighbor at all. Ai\d why should
they? They might have heard that
Glatt spends mo^ of his time in Eu-
rope, bit Bhat's haftfty atypical of the
Tmm & Country set. They probably

iigured Glatt to be the kind of man
v/ho spends money to buy privacy.

In that they are correct. But per-
haps it would suiprLse locals to leam
that their reclusK-e neighbor is one of
the most important and enigmatic
arms dealers of all time. For mote
than a quarter century, Glatt has had
a hand in some of the most sensatioivr
al U.S. covert operations. He secretly
funneled weapons co a number of
American-backed guerrilla forces and
client regimes during the Cold War,
and was the leading supplier fot the
Foreign Materiel Acquisition Pro-
gram (FMA), a still-active "black"
U.S. military c^peratioti that obtained
huge amounts of weaponry from the
former Soviet bloc and other "ene^
my" states. Yet he and his govern*
ment sponsors have so successfully
hidden his activities that Glart is
barely known outside of intelligence
circles,

f first came across Glatt when the
National Security News Service toU
me of an unreported 1995 lawsuit be-
tween Glatt and a fotmer Pentagon
official named Charles Petty. The
lawsuit, filed by Glatt at the Fairfax
County Courthouse in Virginia and
settled <m tertm sealed from the pub-
lic, stenuned from a batched effort uy
sell Hungarian-made mortars to the
U.S. Army. During the discovery
process, Petty's lawyer asked Glatt to
reveal his connections to dozens of
people. In addition to many retired
and active-duty military officers,
these ranged from the notorious —
Oliver North and Ed Wilson, the for-

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 49 of 69

iner CIA agenl now serving a fifty-
two-year jai! term for sellmg explo-
sives CO Muaramar Qaddafi and then
attempting to kill Lawrence Barcella,
the U.S. attorney who prosecuted
him — to the obscure — "Loftur Jo-
harmesson the 'Icelander'" and "One
Mr. Martin in Miami,"' hotli of whom
[ later discovered are arms dealers.
Gbtt V. Petty was settled before Glatt
responded to the motion for discov-
ery, hut the list of names provided a
usefol guide for investigating his ca-
reer. I tracked down most of the
people named, and the majority were
willing to talk to me. as were many
in the U.S. intelligence community,
though often they asked to remain
anonymous,'

Glatr had never before given an
on-the-record interview, but over
the twenty months 1 investigated
him we did have several friendly
phone conversations and correspon-
dences, though be skirted most of
my questions. Not only was Glatt's
ctxjperation limited but his acquain-
tances often provided confiising and
contradictory information. A num-
ber of people insisted chat Glatt is
Austrian, not German. Some de-
ntxinced Gbtt as a Nasi, while oth-
eiis said with equal certainty that he
is secretly Jewish. From his current
home at the maximum-security' Al-
lenwood Federal Penitentiary in

' That 1 encountered iuch iecrecy is hardly
SMrtTOing, Arms deafen operate wdm a mow
of front cmpanks, aHasa, <bu1 Suisi bank ac-
counts. Charks Kerr, assistant counsel for
the Smme dumg the iT«n-<]<mcra hecair^s,
ttM nw thai one vieapom brciier he inier-
vkumi confessed to hmiing "operated in. a tvM
of nurrim for so lonj? that he himself diM't
kmnt! the aj^fer^nce fewen fact anifktim
anynuwe." Purtbemvxe, Glatt's imiverse is a
wry one , mtd hefim Jot^ I'd humped (.^linst
its outer limits . Former arms dedtr An/ bttr-
runi coiled me umciiated; he was "curious.'
When I ranf Hichael Kokin, an American
who brthirm dmk for the CIA dxaine the
l9S0s, the first thing he said uas, "I've been
ey^ctingymtrcc&"; thtsemnd vm, "i um't
talk wim you." BeasMe Glatt's activities on
hehdfof the linitd States remain classified,
evenhendly sources revecdaoi only afraaim
of umt tkiy knew. And mi everyone was
frtmUy, One pet».m reftised to helbbeatuse,
he said, tlxre were peojie withm mt •.vmrnd.
secwrity tstdikkrr^nt who woiM ^efer thai
! net write the su/ry. Tlte CIA WimU rKitfier
amfim nor deny a rdatianship wiAG'katim
said that if there were an msociation, the
agenc? wasn't p/repared txj discuss it.

Pennsylvania, Ed Wilson sent a
cryptic remark: "Yes, I knew Werner.
B«t no one knew Werner well! He is
a smooth character."' Another
8t)urce claimed that Ernst Werner
Glatt is not a real petm)n but merely
an alias for a U.S. intelligence agent.

What I discovered about Glatt is
nonetheless a remarkable and re-
vealing story. Hi.s business holdings

London two blocks from Harrtxls, an
estate in Austria, and another in
Luxembourg, his principal resi-
dence. His most lavish holding is a
vast forested estate near Edinburgh,
bought in the early 1980s from a f<»r-
mer lord mayor of kmdon; Gkrt, an
avid equestrian, built an enormous
indoor practice ring so that the
Scotti.sh weather would not deter

include factories, farms, and real es-
tate spread across Europe, the Mid-
dle East, and the United Stares. In
addition to the Black Eagle, he owns
three Swiss chalets, an apartment in

^' Wikon, who imticcessftdlj tried tti interest
Glm in selling arms m Libya, "I hked
him a i(Jt " Wibon's affsciiim was (^rtwrent-
% not reciorocated. Ijmrencc BaxceUa, who
kmtcdh hecamt Giim's auorr^ after sert>-
ing as me assisiam U.S. aaamey who put
Wison bdiind bars, says that Glati provmd
tl^ Justice Department with informatitm ahcui
W^m's tmrvemems after he hctd been imikt-
ed hut rematrmd at haj^ tn LS/ya.

him from riding. His friends and col-
leagues are just as baroque ami di-
verse — they include European aris-
tocrats. Middle Eastern officials, and
Third World defense ministers —
and his ties to the American mili-
tary run deep — he helped fund the
High Frontier, the "Star Wars" lob-
by headed, until his death, by
Glatt's close friend General I>uiiel
Graham.

Combined with bus miliiary bru.sh
cut, tailor-made f-uits, and duelmj;
scar, Glatt's trade and appetite for

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 50 of 69

luxury make it easy to typecast him
as the kind of shadowy villain who
populates the lames Botid gente. But
the uncoinfortahle truth is that
Glatt and his. ilk ate siraultaneouslv
OC? and SPECTRE'S Ernst Sravro
Rlolcld,' acting as biitli £;«vemment
agenti: and mercenaries with
only the "pure raotive of
pure profit" in mind. "Do you
want tiim to be a hi'to or a
snnkc !" tusked one former in-
telligence official, "Ijecause
he's both." The Bond movies
are of course a isoothingly
jingoistic version of the Cold
War. If we are truly ro under-
stand that era we must exam-
ine the men who were the
means by which the United
States asserted its political
agenda on the rest of the
world, Glatt liad a major role
in almost every action the
Uirited States orchestrated
CD fight Communism: the
arming of the Qintras, the
wars in Afghanistan, Soma-
lia, Angola, and on and on.
A virtual how-to guide for
covert operations, Glatt's
talc reveals the relationship
between governments and
black'raarket anns dealers,
and affords us new insight
into American foreign policy
since World War II. when
atttt-Communisra, national security,
and othet dogmas weie invoked as
rationales for conducting secret
wars, supporting military dictators,
and ignoring national and interna-
tional laws, all in the name of
tlcmoctacy.

MBRCHANTS OF DEATH

The term "merchants of death"
arose in the early 1900s,
when the giant munitions
makers of the diiy dispatched agents
around the globe to advance their
commert iai interests. Salesmen sold
to b)t{i sides of a conflict, bought off
governntent officials, and used their
power to tncre;ise tntetnatiorual ten-

Uk: [kifid'i archnmesii, Glmkn a x)ft sfx>t
for aivmds. After Pan Am deeUned to let ha
dixhshund itt in a fim-chm seat, Gktt dg'
pioiuxi avi mm jW the mline ogflm.

sion, this being the mt«t practical
means ©f generating dentand.^ f^sisil
Zaharoff, the most femous of these
mierchants, represented several big
Western munittons firms and was
thoughr to be the inspiration for
Shaw's Andrew Undershaft. (Under-

shaft's motto; "Give arms to all men
who offer an honest price for them,
without respect of persons or princi-
ples.") Zaharoff pioneered the use of
credit, thereby paving the way for
arms races among cash-strapped na-
tions, and was especially adept at fu-
eling military insecurity. His most
noted accomplishment came in the
late 1800s, when, as a salesmiin for

The spirit of the times ui« captured in a
I9J2 kii&r iK'iu hy a Cdi Ftrcarms executiix
lo a cwnJJunj rcpreseniaUtie. "Dm Mr. FoS'
ter,'' (he letter pjwnj. "in view of the jiareitp
in some of the Latin American aimtries, it
wcnM he m>n advimUe for you to keep cbse-

in (ouch iwdi the GiJr/misan, BoHviim, and
P^vim ccmsvk, oAvimg them ihm we m-
dersiand their respective amniries vwy fae in
ffie treirket for mmiticm anj it is ma desire to
extend rfain evay cciope^atim . As, you kmiv ,
(tee opira bauffe revolutions are usudly
timt-Uved, md we inust nwke l/ie most tff
theot^artamtj.'

the Swedish company Nordenfeldt,
he sold a submarine to Greece, a
country he claimed when it suited
him, explaining to a Greek {)fficia!
that he was "first a Greek, a patriot
like yourself," and only second i
salesman. Whereupon Zahjiroff im-
mediately went to the
Turks, the Greeks' most
hated enemy, and so terri-
fied them with tales of the
sinister new Greek suhma-
ritie that they bought two
of their own.

The activities of Za-
haroff and other arms
salesmen outraged the
public, and by 1934 the
call "to take the profit out
of war" led the U.S. Sen-
ate to convene a special
committee, which con-
chded that dealers "pro-
duce fear, hostility, and
greater munitions ordets
on die part of neighboring
coimtries, ailminating in
economic strain and col-
lapse Of war." But the sub-
sequent reforms (hence-
forth all arms makcR had
to .seek att export license
from the State Depart-
ment) hardly put an end
to weapons manufactur-
ing, which was an ever
more important compo-
nent of modern economies. As
George Thayer wrote in his 1969
k)ok, The War Btwiness, "Instead of
operating at ! 0 to ZD per cent of ca-
pacity . . . the free-world's anns indus'
tries have Ijeen operating since the
late 1940s at 80 to 90 per ceni of ca-
pacity. With governments eixsuring
high productiim levels and buying
nearly the entire output, arms indus-
tries have had no need of Zahaniff-
type salesmen who toam the world
in search of sales."

Far from restraining die arms trade,
government oversight merely institu-
tionalized It. The State Department
won't release its Itst but say,s th.at "lens
of thoieands" of companies and indi-
viduak arc registered to .sell weapons
abroad. As Thayer wrote, the officials
who supervise the trade "control bud-
gets that would stagger the imagina-
tion of a Zaharoff , and they i»(ierate in

54 H.'^RPKR'S MAG.^ZINE/ MAY 2000

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 51 of 69

bureaucracies that are so large, So
Byzdntinc, powerful that effectively
tliey are beyoiKl the control d elected
representatives .."

The hulic of the global weapons
busines-s i,s coinposed of tanks,
planes, ships, and other big-ticket
Items sold by and to governments.
(In 1998 the U.S. government sold
S7 billion worth of weapons- -rough-
ly one third of the $21 billion world
market — and delivcretl another $]C
bilfii;Hi that h<id been ordered in pre-
vious years.) But private arms dealers
still come in handy, especially when
governments wi,?h to ship materiel
discreetly to controversial clientji;
guerrilla armies, regimes facing inter-
national arms embargoes, and states
that are notorious human-rights
abusers. In this regard, nothing has
chansjeJ since 1934, when H. C. En-
gelbrecht and F. C. Hanighen wrote
in their famou.? hook, Merciiants' of
Death: A Study of the Incernaciofial
ArmatTicms Jndttstr>, "The interna-
tional sale of arms . , . hjas far deeper
nx5ts than the 'conscienceless greed'
of the arms makers. If all private
arms makers decided to discontinue
their international traffic tomorrow,
a world-wide protest of governments
would not permit them to do it."

A 1997 article in June's Jntel/igence
Review estimates that such bbck-mar-
ket sales come to about $2 billion in
lean years and up to five times
that much in good ones. Private
dealers such as Olatt primarily
supply rifles, machine guns, mor-
tiirs, grenade launchers, antitank
riKkets, and other materiel used
in small-scale wars. And by arm-
ing combatants in border skir-
mishes and civil and proxy wars,
they plijy a far more significaty: role in
geopolitical affairs than is reflected by
this relatively small percenuige of the
global arms trade. To keep such sales
out of the public eye. brokers break
the paper trail by setting up shell
companies and offshore bank ac-
counts, .securing needed documents
such as end-user certificates — which
serve as a pledge by putchasets not to
reexport military mat€"Tiel to third
parties, but which, for the right price,
stime governments .'ire willing to issue
regardless of the true destination of
the arats— and handling the delicate

task of paving off government officials
and customs s^nts. Most tm{x>rtant,
middlemen provide governments
with "plaiBible deniability" if a deal is
exposed or otherwise bungled. "That
old opening to Mission ImpossiUe is
true," sa^ one arms dealer. "The sec-
retstt^ really will disavow any knowl-
edge of you if things go wror^,"

Buyers, especiatly pariah regimes,
also employ brokers. Identifying a
source of tnerchandise, shopping for
a giKxi price, and arranging shipping
and financing can be complicated,
especially if the parties involved pre-
fer to operate in the shadows. "Why
do buyers use brokers!" asked Val
Forgett, as we sat in the modest of-
fices of hfs company, Navy Arms of
Ridgeficld, New Jersey. "For the
sanie reason you use one when you're
looking to buy a house,"

Forgett decided to become a
weaptins trader when, as a child, he
read about LiharofPs exploits; during
our interview, he pulled his 1948
high school yearbook from a book-
shelf and pointed to the words below
his graduation phoro: "Will design
and export arms." Today, Forgett
sells mainly to collectors, but he lias
daalt with controversial regimes,
such as Augusto Pinochet's, that
were supposedly under international
arms embargoes. "Ninety percent of
the things that are said about the

'black market' in arm* are the fig-
ment of writers' and politicians'
imagination," Forgett says. "There
are no secrets in this world. Every-
body kiVows what you're doing. If
weapt)ns are being 'smuggled,' some
government agency is behind it." For
example, despite a worldwide embar-
go, in 1993 $2 billion worth of arms
flowed to Balkan war combatants;
Gennany helped arm Croatia, Rass-
ian entrepreneurs supplied Serbia,
atKl Iran, with help from the United
States, funneled weapons to Bosnia. I
mked Forgett if there is a r^pne Ik:

wouldn't sell to. "There might be,
but I can't think of one off-hand," he
replied. "Our govert\ment is the
biggest anns dealer in the world, tind
if they issue me a license I'll sell."

UBER ALtES

There are modern arms dealers
who have made more money
than Glatt, among thein Ad-
nan Khashoggi, wht^ for many yeara
rqjresentetl Lockheed and <irher U.S.
companies that sold weapons to Sau-
di Arabia, and Sarkis Soghanalian,
who began by arming Christian mili-
tias in Ixhanon at the request of the
CIA and was the leading supplier a(
Saddam Hussein during the \9dDs. Bur
these men largely made: their money on
registered transactions that went
tlirough official cliaimels. Glatt, to the
best of my krujwledge, never engaged
in an aboveboard deal. When, as was
frequently the case, he arranged kyr a
shipment at the behest of the U.S.
government, it always involved a pho-
ny paper trail to obsciire the tnie buy-
er atui seller of the weapons. Glatt was
a t(Xjl that the U.S. governifterir used
when it didn't want the pjbllc to know
what it was doing.

If the oi\e page of information re-
leased by Army Intelligence is tt) be
believed, Glatt was bom on Ajjril 13,
1928, and raised near the small Ger-

man town of Lorrach, on the edge of
the Black Forest. The forest was the
setting for many of the traditional
German feiry tales that Glatt read vo-
raciously as a child. And perhaps for
that reason he identified with an im-
portant figure in those legends,
Wieland, a magical smith who could
fashion elaborate armor, shields,
swords, nnd even metal wings he once
used to ^cape an evil king. A lien) i.s
a ronqueror, Glatt has told acquain-
tances, but Wielarid is the real pn/es-
sional. His family grew prosperous,
Glatt says, in textiles, tires, and real

Arms dealers like glatt are tools that
the u.s. government uses when it dof^n't want
the public to know what it's doing

Case 2:14-cr-00191'-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 52 of 69

estate. They were also avidly pro-
Naii during Hitler's years in power.
A fonner Army inrelligetice officer
who became an arms dealer, and
whom I will refer to as "Colonel
Ryan." has reviewed Glart's CIA file.
Colonel Ryan said that Glatt's fa-
ther, an officer in the Nazi army, was
badly wounded on the Russian front.
Gl-att him.seif joined the Hitler
Youth — as did the great majority of
young Germans — and served in an
air defense unit sent to occupied
France. Allied forces captured his
unit in the waning days of the war,
and at the age of seventeen Glatt
spent time in a French POW camp.
"He grew up as a thoroughly indoc-
trinated young German," Ryan says.
"Germany's defeat at the end of the
war was crushing for him, as was the
fact that he lived in an occupied, di-
vided country. He [became] an ar-
dent nationalist with severe right-
wing tendencies, but ... he didn't do
any stoking of the ovais."

After returning to Germany, Glatt
giraduatcd from the University of
Heidelberg, where he studied eco-
nomies, political science, law, and
history and joined one of the univer-
sity's dueling societies, which were
incubators of the German right wing.

Ottgbjatiiig with Nazi indoctrina-
tion, Glatt's virulent anti-Commu-
nism was later reinforced by his inter^
action with the American military
and his obsessive love of money. But
his acquaintances differ over whether
he shows any residual traces of anti-
Semitism. The vast majority of
people who know him .say he doesn't,
pointing out that in 1960 he married
Vera Gmelin, the daughter of an aris-
Kxratic Jewish family that fled .Aus-
tria when the Nazis annexed it. (Al-
though she converted to Glatt's
Calvinist faith, he was detained dur-
it\g a trip to Saudi .Arabia when a
German competitor informed securi-
ty forces that Glatt was married to a
Jew. Glatt was freed a day later on
the orders of his Saudi contact, who
was a relative of King Faisal's.) Over
the years, Glatt has made significant
itwestments and many friendships in
Israel. "He was a Deutschkond ^xr <Jes
type of guy and would never apologize
for what the Germans did," says a re-
tired American general. "But if you
asked him if it was a good idea to
weed out d\e Jews, 1 presume he'd say
no." On the other hand, 1 spoke to a
few people who had an experience
similar to that of gunrunner John Mi-
ley, who recounts meeting Glatt fat

stweotype, perhaps because it amuses
him and perhaps because, in his busi-
ness, such a stereotype might s«ne-
times work to ycwr advantage.

"Glatt liked the idea of bribing communist

OFFICIALS to sell US COMMUNIST WEAPONS TO KILL
COMMUNISTS," SAID GENERAL JOHN SINGLAUB

Glatt sports a scar on his cheek from
a match, considered a mark of honor,
and still clearly views Fascism as be-
ing preferable to Communism.
"Since my early days m university, I
wanted to know why there are still
people which do not hate Commu-
nism, for Communiistn had killed un-
til 1939 [the year Hitler invaded
Poland) 40 million people. Until
1989 the Communists kil W appt»xi-
matcly 180 million pec^le," he wrote
me. "1 wonder why the mass media
keep the 'public' in the dark, and a
number of Qimmunists are back in
power and politics, and I wonder
even more why people ask me why I
am anti-Comtnunisc."

the first time: "He starts off on this
Nazi routine, that the one thing he'd
tike to see before he dies is the resur-
rection of the Third Reich," Miley
says. "He didn't care about a nuclear
exchange between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union, because it would cre-
ate a power void that Germany would
fill. Maybe he was just trying to shock
me, bur it was offensive."

My own sense is that this posturing
is too straight out of central casting to
be taken very seriously. Certainly
Glart likes getting under people's skin,
md he displays the exceedingly black
humot common in these circles. And
so it makes perfect sense that he
wmld enjoy playing with his own

BUILOWO A
GUNRUNNIMG EMPIRE

In any case, postwar Germany was
not the best place for a man with
Glatt's ambition to make his
mark, and he soon "decided that 1
needed to study languages if I wanted
to succeed in international business."
By 1959 he was a student at the Uni-
versity of Geneva, where he met Sam
Cumraings, the most famous arms
dealer of the time. After serving as a
gun instructor for the U.S. .Army
durlivg World War II, Cummings
went to work for the CIA. He was
sent to Europe with a cover stfwy of
purchasing weapons on behalf of a
Hollywood studio, but his real task
was to buy up surplus waitime stocks,
which the CIA funneled to organiza^
tions and governments friendly tO
American interests. In 1953, GUm-
mings launched his own company,
Interarms, which supplied weapoivs
for the 1954 ClA-lcd coup in Guate-
mala and for pro-U.S. dictators such
as Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua
and Rafael TtujiUo in the Do-
minican Republic.

Impressed with Glatt's linguis-
tic dfilk, Cummings asked Glatt
to try to buy weapons in Bu-
<lapest, which was difficult for
Americam to enter. When Glatt
was successful, Cummings sent
him on other trips to the Eastern
bloc, and this hobby «Jon became a
full-time job. Glatt rose quickly widv-
in company raitks, eventually becom-
ing a vice president. The two men
became so close that Glatt served at
Cummings's wedding m his best man.
(Or so says Glatt. Cummings has
claimed it was the other way
around — just one of the ways these
two would play out elalx)rdte domi-
nance issues.)

Glatt left Cummings's employ in
the early 1970s, but the two men
continued to collaborate imtil later in
the decade, when Cummings acoKcd
Glatt of cheating him out of a major
deal. For his part, Glatt told me that
he cut ties with Cummings when the

56 HARPER'S MAOAZmV. i MAY 2iXX!

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 53 of 69

latter became persona tion grata at
the Pentagon because of what Glatt
called "hLs love for stupid publicity,
[which] caus^ all sorts of difficulties
with the competent authorities in the
trade and d&cted tny income." Glatt
told me that another reason for
Cummings's diminished stature was
that in the 19703 he renounced his
U.S. citizenship for tax purposes.
Given that the CIA has worked with
Nazi war criminals and Guatemalan
death squad membeis, I found it hard
to believe that this act could get one
blacklisted, until several in-
telligence sources corrobo-
rated that it did.

Whatever the circum-
stances, the falling-out coin- *
cided with Cummings's eclipse
in the arrtw world. From the
mid-1970s until his death in
1997, Cumraings sold mostly
to collectors, thougji he would
brag to journalists that he still
kept enough wea|XH)s on hand
to equip fiarty army divisicxis.
la the end, "Cumraings was
the P. T. Bamum of the gun
business," says Colonel Ryan.
"He had a warehciuse full of
junk — old, antiquated arms —
and there were probably
enou^ rifles to ourfit a divi-
sion. But there's no magic in
having a warehouse. 1 could buy rifles in
lots of 1 ,000 today without blinking an
eye. All he did was every once in a
white dump a few thousand rifles into
some African countries that nobody
gave a flying fiick about."

-After his break with Cummings,
Glatt became obsessed with outdo-
ing his former employer. Like Cum-
mings, Glatt got into the business of
refurbishing used weapons and for a
time was a co-owner of a company
called Collector's Armoury, in sub-
urban Virginia. Cummings had a
huge farm in Middteburg,' so Glatr
bought the Black Eagle. "He often

5 it Mxu there that in 1997 Cumnmgt'i (ijugh-
ter Susan Med her Ar^nmecn poki-piover
boyfriend Roberto Viffejas mih a WiMer PI .
Prosecuuns claimed mat she shot him four
mnesmheaeeaaoissant,bMtxrlmvyet(hest
hnmm for defending Lorena Bobbitt) per-
suaded rfte /ury that tt vm itif -defense. Con-
mcted of vottmtcay mmdaughter, Citmmmgs
received dxty days ir\jmlar\da$2,50Qfme.

said he warited above all else to be
bi^r in the arms business than any-
one else, particularly Sam Cum-
mings, so that one day the West
German government would call him
to Bonn and! oflfer him the positifm
of defense minister,'" says a former
business partner. The call from Bonn
never came, but by the late 1970s
Glatt was known as one of the top
intematicmal arms dealers.

It was a marvelous time to he in
the arms business. After selling for
years almost exclusively to close al-

brought Pinochet to pwer, its attempt
to assassinate Fidel Castro, and other
embarrassments — left the CIA badly
uninformed about the intemalional
arms market "Turner fired the old
boys, and they were the memory bank,"
says Vietnam veteran John Miley, who
in 1979 became a junior partner to
Loftur Johannesson (The Icelander"
from Petty's list) after having served as
an assistant army attache to the Amer-
ican Embassy in London. "The new
boys couldn't find their names in a
telephone book."

lies, the United States had begun of-
fering up sophisticated arms to Third
World countries as a means of win-
ning suf^rt in the Cold War. Buy-
ers were also plentiful. In 1973,
OPEC raised oil prices by 70 percent,
and a number of once poor countries
were awash in "petrodollars," grtet
quantities of which were recycled
back to Western countries via arms
purchases. The American govern-
ment's sales soared from less than $5
billion in 1970 to $27 billion in 1982
(figures adjusted for inflation).

A proliferation of U.S. covert op-
eratitms in suppwt of anti-&:fv'iet guer-
rilla groups feKJUi^t about a simulta-
neous boom in the black market.
Private weapons brokers were in great
demand, especially after CIA Direc-
tor Stansfield Turner he^n dismiss-
ing some 80D agents in mid-1977. The
firings — which came in response to
revelations about the agency's in-
volv^rteat in the Oyiean coi^ that

Miley now lives in suburban Tam-
pa, and wc spent the better part of
two days going through old files in
his small study, where a solitary air
purifier was hopelessly overwhelmed
by the cigarettes Miley ferociously
consumed. Once Miley armed revo-
lutions; today he publishes a commu-
nity newsletter and, like virtually
every former gunrunner I met,
dreams of writing his memoirs. He
told me how Glatt would sometimes
team up with Johannesson, a former
commercial pilot and Red Cross flyer
who ran a Panamanian-registered
shell company called Techaid Inter-
national out of an eighth-floor c^ce
at London's Roebuck House. One of
Techaid's most lucrative operations
came in 1980, when Miley and
Johannesson supplied the CIA with
rifles and other weapons for anti-
Communist guerrillas in Afghan-
istan. The CIA could, of ccwrse, ac-
quire all the American-made

REPORT 57

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 54 of 69

equipment it desired, but for covert
operations the agency preferred So-
viet materiel. Not only was it cheap
and of high quality but its use ob-
scured American fingerprints. Carry-
ing Russian equipment also allowed
L'.S.-baclced groups to rearm them-
selves on the battlefield with
weapons captured from Soviet-sup-
plied opponents. "You're not sending
Fedex," a U.S. Special Forces veter-
an patiently explained. "Shipping
routes are often difficult, and you
might not be able to send in Ameri-
can weapons whenever you want."

One of the perverse secrets of the
Cold War was that, if properly
greased. Eastern bloc ofTiciak were
more than willing to sell Russian
equipment to arms dealers working
with the West. Russia's allies were so
desperate for hard currency that such
sales were frequently approved at the
highest levels of government, eveti
when it was obvious that the
materiel would end up in the hands
of anti-Communist armies. No one
was better at quietly tapping into So-
viet bloc armories than Glatt, who
had worked extensively in Eastern
Europe during his years with Cum-
mirjgs. And as a European, Glatt was
exempt from the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, which prohibits
Americans from bribing foreign offe-
eials. "He liked the idea of bribing
Communist officials to sell us Com-
munist weapons that could be used
to kill Communists," retired U.S.
General John Singlaub, who worked
with Glatt in the 19808, told me,
"He thought that was neat."

Ready access to Soviet equipment
and exemption from American laws
also made Glatt a valuable source to
the Foreign Materiel Acquisition
Program, the "black" operation run
by the three military services and the
Defense Intelligence AgeiKy. Unlike
the CIA, which passed Russian
materiel on to its Third World allies,
the services used Eastern bloc equip-
ment to test against their own equip-
ment and design countermeasures.
■'What Glatt [along with other U.S.-
linked dealers) was able to do just
boggle? the mind," says a former
CIA official. 'They were dealing
with Communist officials at the
highest levels and getting factory-

fresh weapons out of tht Eastern
bloc. There was nothing money
couldn't buy,"

Indeed, it was Glatt's great wealdb.
which grew by leaps and bounds as
he pro^jcred in die anas trade, that
often gave him a leg up oa his rivals.
Colonel Ryan recalls that he once
had a jump on a deal but didn't have
sufficient ftmds to secure a $7 million
tetter of credit nmled to close it As
Ryan began the process of arranging
a bank loan, Glatt used personal
funds to secure a letter of credit, arjj
the weapora in question disappeared
from the marlret. Money was also vi-
tal in obtaining an end-user certifi-
cate showing a false destination — a
piece of paper essential to any secret-
weapons transaaion. Viennese arms
dealer Heinz Baumann said the going
rate was around $50,CXX) and fondly
remembered the flexibility of Peru-
vian officials in supplying this vital
document. "If all the eiKl-users issued
over the years by Peru were legiti-
mate, the country' would have a big-
ger army than the United States," he
sakl. A retired CIA agent waxed nos-
talgic over Chad in the same regard.
The country was poor, the govern-
ment corrupt, communications al-
most nonexistent, and for a long
time the Soviets didn't have repre-
sentation there," he said. "It was an
ideal situation." Glatt is said to have
secured end- users from a variety of
Third World countries, including
Syria, Nigeria, and Oman, which was
more or less run as a subsidiary of
Western intelligence services.

Beyond that, Glatt's success
stemmed from a keen intellect, a
powerfiil personality, a fiercely com-
petitive business drive, and what
several arms dc:alers described as
"steel nuts."

HOW TME '^/MSr W0it
SOMALIA

Glatt's first major operation
for the United States, and
one that made him a small
fortune, involved a 1977 deal to arm
Somali dictator Muhammad Stad
Barre. That year, SoitJalia and
Ethi<.>pia went to War over the dis-
puted Ogaden region, a desolate
stretch of desert lying between the

two countries. Stad Barre had been
the Soviet Union's closest client in
Africa, but Moscow decided to back
Ethiopia — which had been in the
American orbit until a 1974 left-
wing military coup — in the Ogaden
conflict. The Carter Administration
officially declared that it would play
no part in the war, but the Penta-
gon, promising weapons and eco-
nomic aid, quietly encouraged Siad
Barre to break with the Soviets.
"The Carter government clearly un-
derstood that the Horn of Africa was
endangered," Glatt wrote me. "The
situation in Iran had just started to
worsen as well, and the support of
Somalia became a necessity."

Fearing that the still sharp memo-
ries of Vietnam mi^t provoke puMk
opposition if U S. im'olvement was
exposed, the Pentagon gathered a
web of foreign players to handle the
deal. The Saudis, who frequently
supported American covert activi-
ties, picked up the tab for the opera-
tion, which was coordinated by Glatt
and ICW Systems, a private Swiss
arms firm. Glatt, who had a personal
relationship with the Somali defense
minister, was in charge of securing
the needed weapons, which he got
from Technika, Hungary's state-
owned arms company. He presented
Hungarian officials with a fake end-
user certificate showing that the arms
were destined for Nigeria, which
then had close relations with the So-
viet Union.

Charged with moving the arms to
Africa, Loftur johannesson hired his
friend Hank Wanon, a freelance ad-
x'enturer who owned the three Boe-
ing 707s that carried the weapons
from Hungary to Somalia. A Ger-
man Jew, Warton fled the Nazi
regime and joined the U.S. Army.
After the war ended, he obtained a
pilot's license under the G.l. Bill,
and for the next two decades, until
his doctor grounded htm following a
heart attack, Warton was almost al-
ways in the air. In the mid-1960s, he
gained a certain notoriety when he
ferried food and weapons to the Ibo
tribe after it seceded fxoni Nigeria
and declared the independent .state
of Biafra. The Nigerian government
ended the rebellion by cut! ing Bi-
afra's links to the outside world — it

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC

Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 55 of 69

pur. a $250,000 bounty on Wanon's
head for running the blockade —
with the result rixat a million pe(5ple
died from starvation and disease.

Now eighty-three, and still dis-
abled from a crash landing he once
made in Cameroon, Warton recount-
ed his role in the Sotialia episcxle as
we sat in his apartment overlooking
Miami Beach. Warton supplied the
planes and rounded up crews to fly
them (including Larry Raab, a retired
U.S. airman; Alberto Alberty, a
Cuban exile who helped lead the Bay
of Pigs operation; and Bill Lear Jr.,
son of the inventor of the Learjet).
"The crews were mostly Americans,
and they weren't allowed to go to
Budapest, which was behind the Iron
Curtain and off-limits," Warton re-
called. "Glatt said not to worry be-
cause it was all sanctioned by the
CIA and was basically a CIA opera-
tion." Between runs from Budapest to
Jeddah — where the Saudis let them
refuel — to Mogadishu, the pilots
stayed in Salzburg,* where Glatt put
them up at the Hotel Vollerhof. Be-
tween August and December of
197'?, Warton's crews hauled 580
tons of weapons on twenty-eight sep-
arable ili^its to Mogadishu.

All went smoothly until a feud
erupted between ICW and Glatt
over dividing the profits. Like mo.st
arms dealers, Glatt was an ardent
practitioner of what one bmker calls
the trade's First Commandment:
Fuck Thy Neighbor. When the
Swiss company tried to squeeze him
out, Glatt leaked details of the airlift
to newspapers in Switzerland and
England, and the ensuing publicity
shut tlie operation down. Still, from
the U.S. perspective the operation
was a rousing success. Siad Barre
gave the United States rights to
highly desirous naval and air bases.
Things didn't turn out as well for
Somalia itself Ethiopian troops dec-
imated Siad Barre's forces, inflicting
some 100,000 civilian and military
casualties. The United States main-
tained support for the dictator, and
all the weaponry that poured into

" Glait attendi the. Mzimg Mown festhxd
every year; his wife's farmly h^d found the
/esrivai . Glatt says . and at me time ownei 80
percent o/ rfu! Ji&reetos of another great At«-
trian campoia, jnhatm Stroius.

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Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 56 of 69

Somalia destabilized the country,
which fell into a state of complete
anarchy following Siad Bane's over-
throw in 1991, which coincided
with the end of the Cold War. De-
spite the Bush Administration's
brief and disastrous intervention in
Somalia the following year, the
country no longer holds any interest
for the IJnifecf Stares. "The thing
about Somalia," an unnamed "re-
gional analyst" told the Washingcon
Past in 1998, "is they really don't get
the fact that nobody gives a shit
about them anymore."

DEALING WITH THE
CEAU§ESCL\S

Somalia was such a success that
Glatt and Johannesson teamed
up to acquire weapons for the
Foreign Materiel Acquisition Pro-
gram. The FMA dates to 1973, when
the Israelis captured large quantities
of Soviet equipment from Egypt and
Syria during the Yom Kippur W"ar.
Grateful for the help President
Nixon had provided to Israel, Prime
Minister Golda Meir decided to
share the captured weapons. The
Penta|?3n concluded that it needed a
steady supply of Russian arras to test
U.S. weaponry, and the FMA was
bom,

Johannesson had already made
one deal for the FMA, and perhaps
for that reason, when he and Glatt
teamed up in 1979 to acquire Russian
armored personnel carriers firom Ro-
mania, Techaid's London ofi&ce was
their center of operations. Their sec-
retary was Nini Baring, whom associ-
ates recall as rhe estranged wife of an
heir to the Baring Bank fortune. For
transports rion, Techaid sometimes
turned to Farhad Azima, an Iranian
exile who ran a CIA-linked airline
out of Kansas City. (Aiima later be-
came a large donor to the Democrat-
ic Party, thereby winning himself
three White House coffee klatsches
in 1995 and 1996.) Anthony Sykes,
who ran in royal circles thanks to his
marriage to the sister of the Duke of
Devon.shire, sometimes traveled
abroad to meet with potential cus-
tomers. So. too, did Clyde Ferguson,
who'd served as a deputy assistant
secretary of state for African affairs

60 HARPER'S MAGAZINE / MAY 2003

^ntii; rise Nteen y^KS and, follow-
ing his Wef career in the arms trade,
became a Harvard law professor spe-
cializing in iiiternational human
rights. An equally exotic cast of char-
acters occasionally dropped by
Techaid's offices in hopes of drum-
ming up deab of one sort or another,
not alt of them involving arms. Of
parricwlar note was Sheila Petrie, a
one-time burlesque dancer who had
access to a small cargo plane and was
running whiskey to Idi Amin, to
whcKe regime she also sold French lo-
aimotives. "Do you have a good im-
pression or a bad impression of Idi
Amin?" she asked during my initial
call. "Because my experience with
him was very good."

This was the first major deal that
Western arms dealers made with Ro-
mania, and it set the tone for those
that followed. Transactions generally
required bribing the brothers of the
country's dictator, Nicolae Ceau^es-
cu: Marin, who headed the Roman-
ian trade mission in Vienna until
1989, when he committed suicide af-
ter Nicolae was overthrown and
murdered; and llie, who served as
deputy defense minister until being
incarcerated in Bucharest. Nicolae
Ceaujescu often took a cut himself.
As a result, millions of Pentagon
dollars found their way into Swiss
bank accounts controlled by the
Ceaujescu family.

In this case, according to a senbr
military official who read the rele-
vant intelligence reports, Glatt paid
off Marin Ceaufescu, the Peruvian
generals who supplied a bogus end-
user certificate, and officials aboard
the Klek, the Yugoslav passenger
freighter that picked up the Soviet
personnel carriers at a Romanian
port. The Kick headed for America,
where fint the passengers were sup-
posed to disembaik said then the ve-
hicles would disappear into the
hands of army officials, bound for a
military base in Charlottesville, Vir-
ginia, But when the vessel sto^jped at
a travy focilify in Earle, New Jersey,
the vehicles were unloaded before
gaping passengers, who were furiouis
about be'mg delayed. Some calked to
the press, and an Associated Press
story repotted: *ln a move tinged
with my$tery, the U-S. y%«ny has cAj*

tained some new Communist War-
saw Pact military equipment through
a private company whcse identity is
being kept secret." Even worse, one
passenger took a picture of the carri-
ers that somehow got into the hands
of Eastern bloc ofificiaLs. "Heads prob-
ably rolled in Romania, but the vehi-
cles finally ended up in Char-
lottesville," recalls the military
official. The foul-up created a flap at
the Pentagco and led to a bitter split
between Johannesson and Glatt
when the inevitable dispute arose
over the di vision of spoils."

MAN ABOUT GEORGETOWN

Somehow the fallout from the
Klek didn't taint Glatt. Having
established Romania as a major
source of Soviet weaponry, he soon
became the darlir^ d the U,S. ittili-
tary. He established close personal
friendships with a number of high-
ranking militaty officials, hosting
some at the Black Eagle or at his Eu-
ropean estates. Over the years, Glatt
conducted business of one sort or an-
other with various retired military #
ficers and spocjks, among them Gki*
eral John Singlaub and General Ed
Soystcr, a former director of due De-
fense tetelltgence Agency. One intel-
ligence officer's dau^ter bccanw; the
godmother to cwie of Glatt's grand-
children, Thrtxigh his friendship with
General Daniel Graham, Glatt
helped the daughter of a retired gen-
eral get a job at die High Fronrier.

Nevertheless, he was not univer-
sally admired. "I'm no Pollyanna,"
says one former military officer.
"You've got to deal with pec^le you
wouldn't want as friends. I've done a

^ T?ie arms trade is marked by an atmosjAere
of paranoia and greed, and business parmer-
mtis are frequently shan-Uved, "There are a
!ot of bribes pdd , so it's hard for one Jwrtner
mkrmvi«redexpens(sbemgpmdhyihcoti\'
er parmer," says Miky. "You may say you
$250,(XX) in bribes emd ym may even
a check sttS to protie i(, mtthe my you
wrmktopt{ieyeruakkhbackof$lW,0O0,"
After sphm^ ^th Gkm, fduamesson devd-
Qped exdim. contacts in the Emt Gemwm
Stflji. He became a top suffer to lite FMA,
mLm 1987 bvj^adazpiT-ll tacksfm^
CIA. With his earning he fccugk a home in
Barbados cand an estate m Mtnykad's East-
em Shore that was previously awned by a
member of the Dxfwnt favdly .

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 57 of 69

lot of work in intelligence and I ac-
cept that. But Olatt's political views
were repugnant to any decent hu-
man being." Another says, "Arro-
gant. Dictatorial. Stubborn. Go
down the lut of all the endearing
qualities of the German people and
Glatt has them."

By the time Ronald Reagan took
office in 1981, however, U.S. intelli-
gence agencies were fighting to court
Glatt. (Anny Intelligence won out
and became hi.s main handler.) That
year, the Pentagon threw a binhday
party for Glatt at Washington's
George Town Club,* an exclusive pri-
vate club where govemtnenr insiders
and prominent locals discreedy gath-
er to discuss affeirs of state. Held on
the same night that then vice presi-
dent George Bush was feted in anoth-
er part of the club, Glatt's binhday
party was a heady affair, hosted by
club cofounder Milton Notting-
ham-— a friend at»d sometime ship-
ping agent for Glatt — and attended
by senior intelligence officiaU, gener-
als, and bankets who laundered mon-
ey for the Pentagon's "black" pro-
grams. The George Town Club is
secretive (membership u usually re-
vealed only in one's obituary), but
Q)bnd Ryan, who atteided the par-
ty, describes the club as elegant yet
reserved. "It bespeaks good taste,
jx)wer. and sophistication. . . . Thete
are no Robert Hall suits to he found
anywhere."

On several occasions, I spoke with
Ryan at his Washington-area bou-
tique-weapons firm; the nondescript
office was notable only for a sign-in
sheet that asks visitors to declare if
their appointment is of a classified
nature. "There were some people
who felr Glatt was not a nice man.
But who caresT he told me. "West-
em civilization required his ser-
vices." Didn't anyone object to his
choice of the Black Eagle — ^a symbol
of Nazi Germany — as a name for his
Virginia propett>'? I asked. Not at all,
Ryan replied: "Glatt was viewed as a

" The cbth ims /owiiM in 1966 fry power
brokm such as fobert Grm , head t>/ rf iil &
KnmkcAx; PDR mde Tlvmas "Tommy the
Cork" Corcoran; and Tcmpm Park, kwr
reveakd mbea Sosdi Korem agntt vhi'd paid
members of Congress smne $8iX!,000 m in-
jluence policy an Korea ,

source, potentlatty our iMst lucira*
tive source, of Russian arms. We
weren't considering him fesr citizen-
ship, we were hunting for Soviet
weapons that had peat military val-
ue to the United States. The more
virulently right-wing he was, the
more we felt comfortable with him,
because we knew he wouldn't deal
with the Ru^ians. We weren't run-
ning a de-Naiification program. If he
wanted to call his ferra the Black Ea-
gle, that was his business. We
weren't going to tell him what to
name his property."

Ryan's point is logical, but such
ends-justify-the-means paternalism
has also led U.S. intelligence agen-
cies to hire assassins, rig elections,
and arm fanatical guerrillas. "Gov-
ernments need gunrunners and arms
dealers because they don't want to
put the question of whether the
cause they are supporting is accept-
able to their own populations," says
Jack Blum, former special couasel to
the Senate Foreign Relatioas Com-
mittee. 'To me this is disdain for the
demtKtatic process. If rhey believe in
the cause they should be wilting to
face losing the next election." But
why run that risk when you can wntp
yourself in the flag and claim to
know what's best? Arms dealers justi-
fy their actions with the same sour
mix of pragmatism and patriotism as
intelligence operatives (and, given
the revolving door between the two
professions, the distinction seems
mostly semantic). Governments sell
some 90 percent of the world's mili-
tary arms, they point out; besides,
"guns don't kill people" — a philoso
phy that evidently remains just as
soothing when writ large. And when
you're operating at the behest of the
U.S. government, you can also take
additional comfcMt in the "l was just
following orders" defense. But as Dr.
Daniel Nelson of the Marshall
Center points out, "No one who
transfers weapons across borders can
excuse or rationalfcre his activity on
the basis rf presumed governmental
approval The people who profit bear
the burden of their own defense. If I
sell you a weapon to kill someone —
knowing that you will kill with it — I
cannat cisate a case for my norma-
tive eitonetatton based on govem-

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Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 58 of 69

mencal stupidity or collusion. When
you sell instruments of death, you
deal in death."

MAtCING THE WOKLD SAFE
FOR CAPITALISM

The American military intelli-
gence community, however,
perceived the Communist
rfireat to be $0 great that it was will-
ing to set aside almost any moral
qualm or pesky law to combat it.
With ICBMs being paraded tlmwgh
Red Square, the American public
was so terrified by the prospect of
nuclear war that it paid little atten-
tion 10 the regional wars through
which tlie United States and the So-
viet Union fought by proxy. Acctwd-
ing to a 1984 CNN documentary
made on the arms business, of the
160 countries then in the world, the
United States was arming {directly
or through men like Gbtt) 130 of
them, and 40 wars were being waged.

Ronald Reagan's CIA director,
William Casey, greatly expanded the
scope of government-run covert ac-
tions. The agency's support fot the
mujahedin rebels in Afghanistan,
which .started under, jimmy Carter,
grew to liecome a multibillion-AJIar
effort. The United States also ran
huge programs in support of forces
seeking to topple left-wing govern-
ments in Nicaragua and .Anijala Di-
rectly or imlircctiy, Glatt had a hand
in armmg all three of those guerrilla
groups. "1 realized that the monolith-
ic bkx: of the so-called Soviet empire
siiowed big cracks which were beyond
rq5air — As a student of histtiry who
knew what Communi.sm means, I
wished to work on the widening of
the cracks," he wrote me.

It was alsti a gixxi business opiwt-
tunity. Irv the case of Angola, Glatt
purchased Soviet weapons for South
African military ofitcials, who in turn
passed the materiel on to UNITA, a
right-wing guerrilla group led by
Jotias Savimbi. (The CIA also sup-
plied Savimbi and was surely aware
of Glart's acttvitie„s.) Glatt insisted to
me that he did not arm the funda-
mentalist Afghan rebels, who were
fighting a pro-Soviet regime as well
as Russian troops sent by Moscow to
support it. "With the mujahedin tit

Afghanistan I never had any deal-
h^," he wrote. "It is my understands
ii^ that this , . . was done by prtifes^
sionals in tfcis .special type of
business." While technically correct,
1 latjcr learned that the reply was a
classic Gbtt feini. According to at
least three intelligence .stiurces, Glatt
bought huge quantities of weapons
for the mujahedin — land mines,
grenades, rifles, machine guns, and
other small artiu — from CENZIN,
the Polish state arms agetKy. Howev-
er, his client was not the mujahedin
but U.S. Army httelligence, which
turned the materiel over to the Q A,
which in turn transported the
weapc»v: to depots tiie agency set up
in Pakistan. From there, Pakistani
agents sent Glait's provisions across
the Iwrder into Afghanistan for dis-
tribution to the giierrillas.

Glati's biggest find for the muja-
hedin were huttdreds of Russian-
made Strela-l shoulder-launched
.surface-to-air missiles. Glatt
arranged for a Polish plane to carry
the Strclas to a military airsttip in
Oman, where it was met by an
American plane, which then depart-
ed for a U.S. naval base at Diego
Garcia in the Indian Ocean. From
there, the Strelas were shipped to
the CIA's depoLs in Pakisr^in. The
mujahedin used the Strelas against
helicopter gunships flown by Soviet
pilots, and although they weren't
nearly as effective as the American-
made Stingers the CIA Iwgan send-
ing in 1986 they prevented pilots
hom acting impervioitsly. "We want-
ed to see the Russians get their a.s.ses
kicked, and it was demoraliziivg as
shit to have your own vreapons being
fired at you," says a person directly
iiwolved in the Strela deal.

©OJB'S MIGHTY TEAM

In the summer of 1987 the Itan-
Contra hearings were brtiadcast
cm national television, and not
since 1934 were the merchants of
death on such public display. Glatt
had, of course, played a part in the
Iran-Contra affair, chtmgh .so sensi-
tive was his role that the FBI ttx>k
his testimony in secret. Glatt's in-
volvcmetit aime about through his
assoeiatian with eccentric former

beauty queen Barbara Studley. Then
a fight-wing radio host in Miami,
Studley had gathered archconserva-
tive military and political leaders to
establish a Washington-based arms
company called GeoMiliTech Con-
sultants Corporation (GMT). Her
h<;tard members and employees in-
cluded General Singlaub, head of
the World Anti-Communist League;
John Carbaugji^ a top aide to Sena-
tor Jesse Helms; and Robert
Schweitzer, an army general who su-
pervised Oliver North at the Na-
tional Security Q)uncil until he was
fired in 1982 for declaring to a re-
porter that the Russians were prepar-
ing to invade Poland. In his Iran-
Contra deposition, Schweitzer said
the real meaning of GMPs initials
was "God's Mighty Team."

Within GMT, Studley was known
by the code name of "Cleo," as in
C.leopatra, and Glatt — ^"The Baron"
—was her arms dealer of choice, (In
internal memos 1 obtained, GMT
dubbed racket launchers "mothers"
and rockets "children.") Through
Glatt's longtime financial adviser,
Eddy Maisonneuve of the Banque
Nationale de Paris in Geneva, Stu<i-
ley set up a Swiss account to handfe
GMTs funds.

GMT was one of the three impor-
tant suppliers to the Nicaraguan
Contras, the other two being Th&
Enterprise of Oliver North and re-
tired Air Force major general
Richard Secord, and the Honduras-
based Anns Supermarket run by
Ronald Martin, the CIA-linked amis
dealer based in Miami who was cm
Petty's list. Studley declined a re-
quest for an interview, but 1 did
speak with Singlaub at the 1998 Sol-
dier (if Fortitiw convention in Las Ve-
gas, an annual affair at which the re-
tired general is a perennial VIP. Tl\e
four-day event culminated at a
shooting tange on the outskirts of Las
Vegas, where conventioneers ma-
chine-gunned and dynamited a white
van with the word.s "Bin Laden's Ex-
plosives Express, Worldwide Deliver-
ies" painted on its side. Peter Kokalis,
an .SOF editor, emceed the assault,
telling ]ci;es — What do you get when
you cross a bisexual Communist With
a congenital liar.^ An.swer: Chelsea
ClintOT — imd berating reporter.? in

1 50 1 fWPKR'S M-\GAZfHE / MAY mi

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 59 of 69

attendance for being a hunch of pan'
sy-assed liberals.

Inside the vasr exhibition hall
rented by SOF, exhibition booths ol-
fered a vast array of guns and ammu-
nition, photo ops with women clad
In American-flag bikinis, and spa-
cious underground bunkers whete
hj>'ets could comfortably ride out die
apocalypse. I caught up with Sing-
bub as he signed copies of his 1991
autobiography, Hazardom Duty. I
had read Singlaub's book, which
mentions a Western European arms
dealer referred to only as "Sara." Yes,
Singlaub amceded, Sam is a pseudo-
nym for Glatt,'* who came to GMT
on the recommendation of two old
friends — General Daniel Graham,
who had held top positions at both
the CIA antl the DIA; and CIA Di-
rector William Casey. Singlaub first
met Glare in early 1985, at the Palm
Court of Washington's Sheratxin
Carlton Hotel. According to Haz-
(ttdous Duty, Studley and a top Con-
tra official, Adolfo Caleto, were also
in attendance;

"As he perused the shopping list I
had drawii up with {Qmtra leader] En-
rique Bermudez, Sam ncxlded calmly
and made notes on a pad with a gold
mechsmical pencil He might as well
have been pricing out a plumbing job.
Sam looked up and said he could pro-
cure brand-new, high-quality Polish
AKMS-47 assault rifles in quantity for
only $135 each...

"Barbara and I looked at each oth-
er. We had teamed that AK-475 nor-
mally retailed for between $200 and
$100 on the Intcrtjational arms market.
The»e were the lowest prices we had
ever heard quoted.

"'Tliis IS new equipment?' I asked.

'"New from the factory,' Sam as-
sured us. 'This is even better than So-
viet manufacture.'

'"Why are the prices so lowf Bar-
bara asked.

"Sam .shrugged. Tm a good client.""

The deal under discussion came to-

Smgfcmb alio (irDtected Giatt's uknwy before
(he fran-Cwntra comrmttee. Askedby House
invesnmuns w identify hh arms dealer,
SingiatA qx'iLd mi hs ;iijme as C-L-O-T-S.
Leur, aaifused mvesagams asked if S»n^^<8*fe
knew the deaier in (fuestum as Wermr L-0-
T-T. Str^tA now spelled Glat'% nme as K-
L-O-T'Z. No one rwticed the ohfvKatian.

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Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 60 of 69

gether in May of 1 985, seven months
after Congress passed the Boland
Amendtnent forbidding any U.S. aid,
direct or indirect, to the Contras.
Olatt obtained a fake end-user cer-
tificare — from Syria, Singlaub re-
called — and lined up a Greek freighter
chat docked in Gdansk to pick up the
materiel. From there, tlte weapons (in
addition to AK-47st there were ma-
chine guns, grenade launchers, and
shoulder-fired anti-aircraft nxikets)
were delivered to Contra bases in
Honduras. Calero subsequently de-
scribed the shipment as the "biggest
and best" deal arranged for the Con-
tras by the private arms suppliers.'"

Glatt's low prices threatened The
Enterprise's profits, and Oliver North
went to Casey and blackballed Glatt
with a bogus story that the German
wa$ a Soviet double agent. (North told
me he'd never heard of Glatt, which is
hard to fathom given that Glatt'.> name
appears several times in North's infa-
mous National Security Council di-
aries.) Ron ^4artin was also displeased.
He swiftly dispatched an empbyee to
make an unannounced call at the Pol-
ish Embassy in Waiiiington; to the hor-
ror (rf officials th«e, he demanded that
the Arms Supermarket be offered
weapons at the same fwtces. "It took
all of Sara's considerable diploitiatic fi-
nesse (and probably a fair amount of
hush money) to calm down the of-
fended government officials," Singlaub
writes in Hcofirdous Duly.

The following August, Glatt and
Sir^laub <)ffeted a surprising deal to Q A
Director Casey. This was at a point
when Congress had restored funding f«
the CIA's Contra effort, but die appro-
priated moneys would not be available
for several months. So Glatt agreed not
only to sell the CIA millions of dollars
wcrii of Soviet arms from Poland but al-
so to float the agency money to pay for
the merchandise. "Our banker [Maison-
neuve] is prepared to fly to Washlng-

The. deal violated the j/wt if not d\e ktier
of the cmgreKtond ban on miuiary aid to the
Cororos. Gkti'i attorney Laweme BarceMa,
who was m assistant VS. attorney at the
time, (aid me that a gavermnem officid he
would ml identify came to him /or a legfd
ti^xvm dxmt the deal. Barceila insisted then,
and now, that the ded bfcke no laws. "They
were foreign arms from a foreign (hm sent on
a /brdgn sh^ to a foreign group and Glatt
himself um ^foreigner. It wm not ilUga}."

150 H.%RPER'S MAGAZINE/ MAY 2000

tx)n and cake care of the Letter of Cred-
it directly with your designated bank,"
Singlaub informed Casey in a confi-
dential letter. 'This eliminates all bank
tested telexes or paper trails. The loan
can be in the name a( a corporation of
your choice. It Is not necessary for our
bank to know your identity, only your
banker. Our bank has been excej^ion-
ally discreet in pnx;tssing f)ur rransac-
tiotvs in the past. At the close of the
transactions, the bank file will only
show corporations, numbered items
and amounts. No reference will be
made of . . . the individuals ot actual or-
ganizations involved." Casey turned
down the offer — perhaps because of
North's efforts to discredit Gbtt — and
GMTs trail in the Iran-Contra affair
goes cold at diis juncture."

For the American military, all of
the operations Glatt supported were
huge successes, especially Afghan-
btan, where the mujahedin's defeat
of the Red Army accelerated the
breakup of the Soviet Union. As
with Somalia, however, there was a
significant problem of blowback. In
1998, President Clinton ordered
cruise missile attacb on what he de-
scribed as a terrorist training camp
run by Osama bin Laden in a remote
comer of Afghanistan. Other muja-
hedin si^fiofters l\ave noi only been
responsible for acts of terrorism
around the world but are busily
destabilizing Pakistan, thus increas-
ing the likelihood of nuclear war on
the subcontinent. In Angola, the
CIA's old ally Jonas Savimbi was de-
feated in a 1992 presidential elec-
tion. He refiised to honor the results

' ' GMT'i activities were never ftdly ey^lored
b} frcn-Qjnmi ctmnuttee. A weamc^in'
fmmaaoncmihejcmdina }992 swomstaui'
ment pven by Ron Harel — a farmer Israeli
Air Farce officer who ran a GMT a^e in Td
Aviv — in an unrelated lawsuit that invdved
Studky. Harel subwMted dozens of imemd
company tiocwments in support ofks account.
One 1984 mano ciiscusse? a series o/mmings
that Singlaub arranged between Armricanaf'
fidcis — including Oliver North — and Shapoar
Ardaian, an ironian opposition leader warn
the CIA ho!)ed lo enlist w uverthrow the Ay-
atullah Kkmerm and pitt the former Shedt's aui
in pkMier. Durttig rme meeting, a ClAo^foki
is iexrdxd as. offering a briefcase fuS. of mon-
ey tti Arddan . Either an hmest man or em-
harrassed to he receiving so pubfe a brSat,
Ardaian asfed tfim ;«nJng /or his group be
r(juted4ami^its Swiss hem account,

and has again taken up arms agaiast
the country's ^vemraent. Ten years
after the Sandinistas were ousted in
elections in Nicaragua, that country
has yet to recover from the U.S.-
sponsored war. It i.s the seccmtl p<K)r-
est nation in the Western Hemi-
sphere, and its current president is an
old crony of the Somoza dictatorship.
Having anned dubious allies in the
name of preventing the spread of
G,)ramunism, we find that those al-
lies have often turned against us and,
in some cases, turned the very
weapons we supplied upon us.

BOMBING THE OUTHOUSE

If Glatt was an important supplier
of weapons to Reagan's "freedom
fighters," he was more vital yet
in securing Russian weapons for the
Foreign Materiel Acquisition Pro-
gram. Other than a few stories in the
Washington Post — which didn't men-
tion the name of Glatt or any otlier
weapons dealer who supplied the
Pentagon — the program's history is
all but unknown.

The Defense Intelligence A^ncy
and the military services would give
shopping lists to a small group of
Beltway firmis with strong ties to in-
telligence agencies: BDM Interna-
tional, which was bought in 1997 by
defense contractor TRW; Vector Mi-
crowave Research Corp., whose ex-
ecutives included Lieutenant Gcnet-
ftl Leonard Perroots (Retired), a
former director of the DIA; and Elec-
tronic Warfare Associates, whose
bcatd of directors iiKluded, until his
death in 1996, former CIA dirertor
William E. Colby. The American
companies relied in turn on a cabal
of European-based arms brokers to
buy the desired goods in the Eastern
bloc, a strategy that albwed the U.S.
government to dcitt the Foreign Cor-
nipt Practices Act.

By all accounts, Glatt was far and
away the program's single biggest
supplier. During the lawsuit with Pet-
ty, he revealed that he handled be-
tween $150 and $20C million worth
of FMA contracts between 1983 and
1993. His tompetitOTs say that's less
than half the true amount and com-
plain that Glatt exercised undue in-
fluence on the FMA, citing his rela-

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 61 of 69

tionship with Lieutenant Colonel
Larry Caylor, who headed the army
FMA office from 1985 to 1991 and
upon retirement went to work as
Glair's assistant in the anus business.

The FMA's precise budget is hid-
den in the Pentagon's "black" ac-
count ("It's a democracy, but there
are wa^ of hein^ creative," one play-
er said), but I was told that over
$100 million per year was allocated
to the program tliroughout much of
the 1980s. The FMA's black dollars
were laundered by a Washington
branch of the American Security
Bank (now owned by Bank of Amer-
ica), where the Pentagon and the
Beltway firms set up accounts for
their respective dummy corpora-
tions. "We were asked to do it as a
favor to the U.S. government, to do
our patriotic duty," says former
American Security executive
James Kleindienst, "We didn't
know? what the hell they were
buying, and we didn't want to
know. What made me feel damn
good was that after the Gulf
War I got a call from some-
body — I won't mentitm who — at the
big house there in Virginia saying
that thanks to all your work we
knew what that bastard Saddam
Hussein had^"

The FMA sometimes revealed
enoimouB problems with U.S.
weapons systems- In 1984, an Israeli
arms dealer helped to obtain a Sovi-
et-made attack helicopter that was
brougjit to a military testing ground
and matched up against a fantasti-
cally expensive anti-aircraft gun
called the DIVAD. Made by a sub-
sidiary of the Ford Motor Company,
the DIVAD was designed to home in
on the s(^und of helicopter blades.
The demonstriition not only showed
chat the range of the Russian attack
helicopter surpassed that of the
DIVAD but revealed in embarrass-
ing fashion that the DIVAD's hom-
ing mechanism was fatally flawed.
Since a number of military poobahs
attended the demonstration, some-
one decided to install a portable toi-
let near the V.I. P. bleachers. To en-
sure that the generals faced no
unpleasant aromas, a fan was in-
stalled in the outhouse. In the midst
of the test, the DIVAlT-s guas mis-

took the soutd t»f ftn for lietfc-
copter blades, swivekd on the chas-
sis, and blew the (empty) outhouse
to smithereens. Defense Secretary
Caspar Weinberger immediately
killed the DIVAD program.

Glatt declined to discuss his work
for the FMA, so I paid a visit to
Hein2 Ekiumann, who has brokered
deals on behalf of BDM and Elec-
tronic Warfare Associates. Now re-
tired, Baumann resides in Bad Fis-
chau, a spa town in the hills outside
of Vienna. I was put in touch with
him by John Miley, who e-mailed
me: "(Hein:] is one helluva nice
guy. . . suspect you'll be expected to
partake of a healthy ration of
schnapps. Might be useful to go
with the flow and then do the nec-
essary penance." This advice proved

prescient. Wearing a leather jacket
and jeans, Baumann was waiting at
the international arrivals area and,
chough it was only 11 A.M., escorted
me to an airport bar for three
rounds of beer and schnapps. We
then moved on to his comfortable
home, where over many more glass-
es of beer he reminisced about his
biggest coup, purchasing infrared-
seeking missile heads from the
Ulcraine, and other FMA deals. For
each successful transaction — and
the prcKess ccwld take up to a year
from start to nnisli — many more fell
by the wayside. "There was no
steady income," Baumann sighed,
lifting his glass, "In this business
you have to be a dreamer." He
pau-sed and ground out another cig-
arette. "You couldn't get a screw out
of the Eastern bloc without bribes. 1
wouldn't call it a bribe; it was a re-
imbursement for services. If they
did a good job, they deserved the
m<7ney." (Sometimes, in addition to
money, they danced Western elec-
tronics. Miley recalls alwalys provid-
ing Chinese officials with current is-
sues of Playboy and Penthome:
"Quite a few bottles of Tsingtao

beef were consumed in my hotel
room discussing the degenerate
ways of the West." Today, say.s
Colonel Ryan, Russians request Vi-
agra.)

Accoiding to Baumann and oth-
ers, Glatt l\ad carte blanche at CEN-
ZIH, the Polish state arms company.
Glatt became close friends with
CENZlN's head. General Boguslaw
Likowski, a man known affectionate-
ly as Bolo. "Bolo was the key at
CENZIN, but he was also die man-
aging director for all FMA business
in Europe," Baumann said. "When
he told you that a piece from Bulgar-
ia will arrive at three o'clock tomor-
fow, it was there — at five to three.
He knew about all the deliveties,
who was involved, and who to call if
there was trouble."

Over the years, CENZIN sold Glatt
everything from an anridote kit issued
to Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan to
protect them against their own chem-
ical weapons (by analyzing it, the Pen-
tagon could better imderstand the So-
viet chemical-weapons program) to
three Russian -made torpedoes worth
$3.5 million. In the mid-1 980s, Likows-
ki died in a car crash, but Glatt re-
mained in good standing at CENZIN
through his ties to two other key offi-
cials, Zbigniew Tadka and Tadeusz Ki^-
erwas. They were arrested in 1992 in a
sting operation conducted by U.S, Cus-
toms agents in Frankfurt attd accused trf
illegally attempting to sell $15 million
worth of weapons to Iraq. The charges
were later dropped, reportedly at the re-
quest of the CIA, which was grateful for
their service to the United States.

Glatt has credited NATO's easy
success in Kosovo to his work with the
FMA, saying he had bought every-
thing in Serbia's arsenal years ago. Yet
the ¥IAA has seen as much profiteer-
ing as patriotism. In 1997, Vector's of-
fices were raided by federal officials
who claimed chat, amoi^ other things,
dhie company was dcHible-dealing: trad-
ing highly sensitive Stinger missile

We armed dubious allies only to see THEM
TORN AGAINST US. AND SOMETIMES TURN THE VERf
WEAPONS WE SUPPLIED UPON US

REPORT 65

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 62 of 69

technology with the Oiinese in order
to gain Chinese weajxinry to sell to
the United States.

TWILIGHT OF THE GODS

yith the end of die Gild War,
the world of guntunninghsK
▼ ▼ been radically transformed.
The CIA still stages covert operations
but nothing on the scale of the huge
Reagan/Bush-era programs, and now
that the conflict in the Balkans is rel-
atively contained, there are no decent
ware to .speak of The Russian Army
has dumped huge quantities of small
ann.s in the aiurse of its brutal down-
sizing, and China, which is in rhc
pnKess of rearming its troops, recent-
ly added another 2 million old rifles
to the global arms pile. Qimbined with
the growing production of countries
such a.s the Czech Republic, Pakistan,
aiKl Israel the end result is a textbook
case of oversupply and undetdetnand.

The players have changed, to<j.
Where once a few mega-brokers held
sway, today hundreds of small-time
mafioscK who aUo traffic in drugs and
prostitutes have emerged. "The old
giiys cwuld get a pLstol and a tank," says
Keith Prager, a former weapons-trade
specialist for U.S. Customs. "The new
guys can get one or the ott^r, but not
both. They're the kindergarten class
compared U) the oki Ph.D.'s." Some
former Qanmunisc states, most notably
Bulgaria, sell arms to embargoed
regimes and controversial clients with-
out the help of middlemen, fiirdier tvx-
rowing the domain of brokers who ex-
ploited Soviet bbc contacts. "Ten yeats
ago, if you wanted to get something
out of CENZIN you had to go thnwgh
Glatt," says a Washington-area arms
broker. "Now anyone can show up in
Eastern Europe with an end-user cer-
tificate and bay whatever he wants."

Glatt is now seventy-two, and he
likes to portray himself as retired.
Slowed in recent years by a heart by-
pass and a kiut with cancer, he spends
more titne widi his femily and has tak-
en up philanthropy. He has {Mid for an
irrigation system for Swiss farmers, in-
cubators for Polish newborns, and is a
large donor to his alma mater, Hei-
delberg. At the behest of the eminent
American cardiologist Dr. Robert
Matthews, Glatt met with the cardittal

rf Huni^ry and ofifercd to put up $2.2
ittUlfawi ro help fiiiance a tort 1alx>-
ratory for a Catholic hospital in Bu-
dapest. "My 'charitable activities' are
my tribute for having had a wonderlul
and interesting life," Glatt wrote me.
"But t da not want to talk about it. I
am not a Pharisee!"

But if, as he insists, atins now make
up a much smaller part of his business
activities, he remains a player. Glatt
still hosts High Frontier conferences
at his various estates, aid siiKe 1996 he
has carried out at least two large deals
for the BAA. China and North Korea
are currendy targets, as is Russia, which
i.s no longer an official "enemy'' but
which sells to countries that are. Now
materiel comes straight out of the
Kremlin, which is so broke that it is
willing to sell virtually anything— short
of nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapotikV— to the United States. In one
of diose biiarre twists in d»e anns worid,
the Russian military' uses the Penta-
gon's money to finance its next gener-
ation of weaponry. Rosvoorouzhenie,
the Russian state arms agency, pub-
lishes a glosiy seven-volume sales cat-
alogue that includes everthing from
small arms to submarines, planes, and
even warheads. Such an atlas would
have constituted the single biggest in-
tellfeence find (rf die CoW War, now it's
available for $1,500.

Yet Moscow and Washington still
insist on the use of middlemen who can
play the eruluring role of scapegoat in
the event that thin^ go sour. And as al-
ways, Glatt has positioned hiimelf well.
Some years ago a Russian general need-
ed a hip replacement. The. general —
now in a position of some power —
couldn't afford the opetation, so Glatt
paid for it himself And as corporations
start to eclipse nation-states, anms deals
may be deckfcd by board meeting. In
1997, a private company seeking to
business in Awtbaijan came up widi
63ur options to curr^' fevor with the gov-
ernment, otTC of which was to broker a
$20 million arms deal for the country,
is under saiKiion for its a^^esion
agairBt Atm«iia. The ftrm chose an-
other course of action but had identified
Glart as the preferred supplier if the
arms jdan were &>move forward. 'There
are a fat of fly-t^ni#its in die private
mm business," says a person familiar
widi die detaik "Qiao; has been around,

and he's trustwordiy. He's erne of only
four or five men in the world who can
quickly obtain and transport large quan-
tities of Rmsian equipment"

Like Glatt, many of the other arms
dealers who .supplied Cold War com-
batants amtinue to profit from the war
business. In 1998, Barbara Studlev and
Jt^n Singlaub tried to sell an Israeli
missile guidance system to the Amer-
ican government. Ron Martin's com-
pany advettises itself on the World
Wide Web as The *1 Supplier of 40
mm (jrenade Launchers." Richard Se-
cord was seen not knig ago in Azer-
baijan, attempting to sell iLs military a
package of equipment and training.
Sarkis Soghanaltan, who has offices
on the Champs Elysees and works
closely with French intelligence,
helped funnel weapons to the military
officers who overthrew the president of
the Qmgo Republic in 1997. "There's
nothing as big the Iran-Iraq War, but
there's still a lot going on." he told me
from Paris during a phone interview,
"The countries change, but there's ^l*
ways bu-siness." (Indeed. A few months
later he was arrested in the United
Stares an hank-fraud and money-bun-
dering charges,) Even Oliver North,
the would-be sereitnr and talk-show
host, heads a floundering body-artnpr
company called Guardian Technolo-
gies International. "Every time you
think one of these guys lias died he -
turns up somewhere peddling arms,"
says an American weaporw broker who
himself iitill dabbles in die field. "These
guys never die. Once you're in the
bu.«iness, you're in the business."

And why not? Arm.s dealing is an
extremely profitable enterprise con-
ducted remotely by fax and wire trans-
fer. Unlike stildiers, arms dealers rarely
put dieir own lives on the line and nev-
er have to confront the carnage caused
by the weapotw; they sell. To them dicir
xiask is a game; a lot of money, a little
espionage, but few personal conse-
quences. As long as governments em-
pby rfiem, anns dealers like Glatt will
grow rich and old and happily live out
their days in the shadow of patriotism.
For the nu)ment, diere may be less biBi-
ness than in the 1980s, but as Sam
Cummings once noted, '1n the broad-
est sense, the military arms business is
based on hmvm folly. Ami that b an
extremely reliable element." ■

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 63 of 69

Exhibit F

Case 2:14-cr-0ai91-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 64 of 69

Kiser, Jeremy

■om:
^nt:
To:

Subject:

Angelo Yfanfis <angelo.yfantis@russian-petroleum.com>
Tuesday, June 14, 2011 3:25 AM
Yasser Adam; Marc Turi
FW: sale of items

DEAR ANGELO,

I SENT YOU AN EMAIL DAYS BACK AND NO ANSWER FROM YOU ...

ANYHOW , MR STEVENS THE AMERICAN EMBASSEDOR IN BENGHAZI HAS BEEN INFORMED
OF THE ARRANGEMENT .... AND THINGS SHOULD BE OK .

WE HAVE TO BE IN CONSTANT CONTACT FOR ANY UPDATES AND FOR ANY INFORMATION
NEED TO BE DONE

AS YOU KNOW , FOR ME I CA NOT CONTACT YOU AS WE STILL DO NOT HAVE THE
INTERNATIONAL LINE FROM HERE HOWEVER , YOU CAN CALL ME DIRECTLY FROM THE US .

ALSO , CAN YOU SENT ME THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN YOU AND THE QATARI , WHERE THE
QATARI AGREED TO PURCHASE THSESE MERCHANDISE ...AND ONE LAST THING , I MIGHT
SEND YOU SOME MILITARY ITEMS LIKE SPECIAL VEHICLES AND SO ON THAT NEED TO BE
QOUTED ON ...OK

^EST REGARDS AND I HOPE TO RECIEVE YOUR REPLY ..

BY THE WAY THE COMMISSION , NEED TO BE DISCUSSED BECAUSE I DO HAVE AND ARMY OF
TAKERS HERE ....OK

CIAO ,

y

U.S. V. Turi 005769

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 65 of 69

Exhibit G

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 66 of 69

Turi Defense Group, Inc. Mail - DDTC Case #BA-L102-111 https;//niail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=7fDe43aeb2&view=pt&q=jc..

G

Marc Turi <marc@turico.com>

DDTC Case #BA-L102-111

3 messages

Marc Turi <marc@turico.com>
To: jcsneareast@yahoo.com

Dear Mr. Stevens;

I hope your meetings are going well. I wanted to make sure you had
some important information during your discussions. Attached you will
find a request for prior approval with DDTC. As of this moming the
document Is still out for staffing. As you will see we were contacted
in the beginning of March a few days after the council formed. We
immediately requested prior approval however the request was denied. A
new request was resubmitted to the Directorate of Defense Trade
Controls on March 27th and then it was staffed on April 1st to the
following divisions.

1. D0D

2. NEA - Near East Affairs

3. DRL - Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and L.abor

4. PMRSAT - Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Office of Regional
Security and Arms Transfer

We are prepared to move immediately once given an approval should
foreign policy change at NEA.

Best Regards,

Wed, Apr 6, 2011 at 11:26 PM

Marc Turi
President

Turi Defense Group, Inc.

7251 W. Lake Mead Blvd.. Suite 300

Las Vegas, NV 89128

Ph: (888) 953-5999 Fax: (702) 543-1402

Cell: (702) 274-3638

Email: marc@turico.com

Web: www.turidefense.com

2 attachments

PRIOR APPROVAL - 3-27-2011.pdf

275K

®1

DENIAL-3-22-2011.pdf

39K

Stevens chris <jcsneareast@yahoo.com>
To: Marc Turi <marc@turico.com>

Thu,Apr7, 2011 at 11:21 PM

I of 4

11/16/2012 9:09 PM

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 67 of 69

. Turi Defense Group, Inc. Mail - DDTC Case #BA-L102-1 1 1 https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=7f0e43aeb2&view=pt&q=jc..

Dear sir,

Thanl< you for tliis information. I'll keep it in mind and share it with my colleagues in V\feshington. Regards, Chris
Stevens

~- On Wed, 4/6/11, Marc Turl <marc@turico.com> wrote:

From: Marc Turi <marc@turlco.com>
Subject: DDTC Case #BA-L1 02-1 1 1
To: jcsneareast@yahoo.com
Date: Wednesday, April 6. 201 1 , 3:26 PM

Dear Mr. Stevens:

I hope your meetings are going well. I wanted to make sure you had
some important information during your discussions. Attached you vwll
find a request for prior approval with DDTC. As of this morning the
document is still out for staffing. As you will see we were contacted
in the beginning of March a few days after the council formed. V\fe
immediately requested prior approval however the request was denied. A
new request was resubmitted to the Directorate of Defense Trade
Controls on March 27th and then it was staffed on April 1st to the
following divisions.

1. D0D

2. NEA - Near East Affairs

3. DRL - Bureau of Democracy. Human Rights and Labor

4. PMRSAT - Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Office of Regional
Security and Arms Transfer

We are prepared to move immediately once given an approval should
foreign policy change at NEA.

Best Regards,

Marc Turi
President

Turi Defense Group, Inc.

7251 W. Lake Mead Blvd.. Suite 300

Las Vegas, NV 89128

Ph: (888) 953-5999 Fax: (702) 543-1402

Cell: (702) 274-3638

Email: marc@turico.com

Web: www.turidefense.com

Marc Turl <marc@turico.com> Thu, Apr 7, 2011 at 11:22 PM

To: Stevens chris <jcsneareast@yahoo.com>

Roger that! Stay safe!

On Thu, Apr 7, 2011 at 12:21 PM, Stevens chris <jcsneareast@yahoo.com> wrote:
; Dear sir.

Thank you for this information. I'll keep it in mind and share it with my colleagues in Washington. Regards, Chris
Stevens

2 of 4

11/16/2012 9:09 PM

Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 68 of 69

ri Defense Group, Inc. Mail - DDTC Case #BA-L102-1 1 1 https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=7fDe43aeb2&view=pt&q=jc..

— On Wed, 4/6/11, Marc Turi <marc@tunco.com> wrote:

From: Marc Turi <marc@turico,com>
Subject: DDTC Case #BA-L1 02-111
To: jcsneareast@yahoo.com
Date: Wednesday, April 6, 2011. 3:26 PM

Dear Mr. Stevens:

I hope your meetings are going well. I wanted to make sure you had
some important information during your discussions. Attached you will
; find a request for prior approval with DDTC. As of this morning the
i document is still out for staffing. As you will see we were contacted
[ in the beginning of March a few days after the council formed. \Ate
! immediately requested prior approval however the request was denied.

new request was resubmitted to the Directorate of Defense Trade
! Controls on March 27th and then it was staffed on April 1 st to the
, following divisions.

; 1 . DOD

i 2 . N EA - Near East Affairs

I 3. DRL - Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

4. PMRSAT - Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Office of Regional
; Security and Arms Transfer

' We are prepared to move immediately once given an approval should
foreign policy change at NEA.

i Best Regards,

Marc Turi
i President

Turi Defense Group. Inc.

7251 W. Lake Mead Blvd., Suite 300

Las Vegas. NV 891 28
i Ph: (888) 953-5999 Fax: (702) 543-1402
I Cell: (702) 274-3638

Email: marc@turico.com

Web: www.turidefense.com

Marc Turi
President

Turi Defense Group, Inc.

7251 W. Lake Mead Blvd., Suite 300

Las Vegas, NV 89128

Ph: (888) 953-5999 Fax; (702) 543-1402

Email: inarc@turico.com

Web: www.turidefense.com

3 of 4

11/16/2012 9.09 Piv

^ Case 2:14-cr-00191-DGC Document 55 Filed 10/03/14 Page 69 of 69

^ Turi Defense Group, Inc. Mail - DDTC Case #BA-L102-1 1 1 https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=7fDe43aeb2&view=pt&q=jc...

4 of 4

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